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NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO CIVIL
COMMITMENT LAWS: AN UPHILL BATTLE
FOR SEXUAL PREDATORS AFTER
KANSAS V. HENDRICKS
Anne C. Gillespie
The Supreme Court long has recognized that the United States Constitution forbids a state from punishing its citizens twice for a single offense1
or attaching new punitive measures to crimes already committed.2 While
+ J.D. candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that "[n]o
person shall be... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
Id.; see also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (recognizing the applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to afford criminal defendants protection not
only from multiple trials for the same crime, but also from multiple punishments for the
same crime. See Michele M. Jochner, The Unjustified Expansion of the Double Jeopardy
Doctrine to Civil Asset Forfeiture Proceedings,84 ILL. B.J. 70, 71 (1996); see also Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 396 (1995) (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids
states from punishing or attempting to punish a criminal defendant twice for the same
crime) (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)); Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (stating that where a "single act" offends two distinct laws,
separate prosecutions under each law will not constitute double jeopardy "if each statute
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not") (citing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871)). But see United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2152
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the Double Jeopardy Clause only protects
against "successive prosecution, not successive punishment"). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause guards against multiple punishments for the same offense, it does not prevent
a state from prosecuting several crimes in a single proceeding. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467
U.S. 493, 500 (1984). Commentators have noted, however, that courts have been flooded
with double jeopardy challenges based on the prohibition against punishing a defendant
twice in separate proceedings. See Jochner, supra, at 71-72 (noting that proceedings with
both civil and criminal components are particularly susceptible to double jeopardy challenges); see also Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784
(1994) (holding that the imposition of a drug tax in a civil proceeding following a criminal
conviction for the same offense constituted a second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989) (rejecting a
civil penalty that was disproportionately high in relation to the government's damages
following a criminal prosecution for the same offense as violative of the Double Jeopardy
Clause).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1. The first Ex Post Facto Clause of
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the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution substantially curtail a state's ability to castigate its citizens, a state may
regulate individual activity under its parens patriae and police powers.
the Constitution states that "[n]o... ex post facto Law shall be passed." Id. § 9, cl. 3. The
second Ex Post Facto Clause states that "[n]o State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto
Law." Id. § 10, cl. 1. The first Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the federal government and
the second applies to the states. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 428 (5th ed. 1995). Read together, the Ex Post Facto Clauses
prohibit the states and the federal government from punishing individuals for an act that
was lawful when committed but subsequently deemed unlawful. See Gregory Y. Porter,
Note, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court's Ongoing Struggle with Constitutional
Limits on Punitive Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517, 545 (1997) (citing Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 386, 390 (1798)). Moreover, the Ex Post Facto Clauses forbid governments from increasing the penalty for a crime already committed and applying it retroactively. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 428; see also California Dep't of Corrections
v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995) (explaining that not all legislative enactments
amending the punishment for a completed crime violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 390 (standing for the proposition that a statute violates the ex post
facto prohibition when it "inflicts a greaterpunishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed"); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that retroactive application of certain provisions of the state's sex offender law violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause), affd in part, rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (concluding that a
statute must operate retrospectively in order to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
3. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-26 (1905) (noting that a state may
restrict individual liberty through its police power in order to preserve the safety and
health of its citizens); In re Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (stressing
that laws enacted pursuant to a state's public health police power are generally immune
from constitutional attack); Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled
Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1716-17
(1996) [hereinafter Prevention Versus Punishment]. Although the constitutionality of laws
circumscribing individual freedoms often rests on both parens patriae and police power
principles, a subtle distinction exists between the two. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 426 (1979) (noting a state's dual purpose in civilly confining the mentally ill: to provide care pursuant to the state's parens patriaepower to those who cannot care for themselves, and to protect society under its police power from the violent propensities of the
mentally ill). Historically, laws protecting the public from infectious diseases represented
the most common type of police power. See Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudenceof
Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 334 (1989) (describing the State of Pennsylvania's 1798 police
power restriction on travel between New York and Philadelphia in order to thwart the
spread of yellow-fever); see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 631 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that New Jersey's ban on the importation of out-ofstate solid waste was analogous to quarantine laws and, therefore, should be upheld as a
legitimate exercise of the state's power to protect the health and safety of its citizens);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962) (stating that laws regulating drug use
were valid measures aimed at protecting the general health and welfare of the public even
though such laws may restrict individual freedom).
The Court also has acknowledged that the Commerce Clause grants the federal government similar "police" authority. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106
(12th ed. 1991). The Commerce Clause vests Congress with singular power to regulate
interstate commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (interpret-
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The Supreme Court has consistently upheld laws infringing on personal
liberty as legitimate exercises of a state's power to protect public health
and safety. 4 When a state punishes an offender by enating legislation
ing Congress's commerce power as absolute); see also Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v.
United States (the Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 351, 355 (1914) (stressing that
Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce extended to intrastate activities
"having such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce"). Despite the
Court's recognition of Congress's broad economic regulatory commerce powers, interpretations of Congress's authority to control local activities perceived as both economically
and morally deleterious fluctuated. Cf. GUNTHER, supra, at 106; see also Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (upholding under the Commerce
Clause a federal Act that prevented motel owners from discriminating against minorities).
Although the primary purpose of the Act in Heart of Atlanta was to "vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity" caused by racial discrimination, the Court sustained the regulation as a legitimate exercise of Congress's commerce authority because of the burdens that
racial discrimination placed on interstate commerce. See id. at 250, 261-62. The statute at
issue in Heart of Atlanta, however, did not mark Congress's first attempt to use the Commerce Clause as a means to control local activities that affected public welfare and morals.
See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1913) (upholding a federal law that prevented the interstate transportation of prostitutes as a legitimate exercise of Congress's
commerce power). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that
Congress exceeded its commerce power by regulating guns in school zones because the
possession of guns in or near schools was not an economic activity which would "substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce").
4. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987) (holding that the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 did not violate an individual's due process rights because pretrial detention based on an assessment of a defendant's future dangerousness was a regulatory
measure designed to meet "the greater needs of society"). The Salerno Court further
stated that the government's interest in safeguarding the community from dangerous individuals released on bail outweighed a defendant's interest in being free from bodily restraint. See id.; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of a New York law providing for the pretrial detention of juveniles when a
"serious risk" existed that the juvenile would commit a crime if released on bail); United
States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1324, 1332 (D.C. 1981) (sustaining a District of Columbia statute authorizing pretrial detention as a valid non-punitive measure aimed at protecting the public); Thomas C. French, Note, Is It Punitive or Is It Regulatory? United
States v. Salerno, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 189, 193, 197 (1988) (describing various judicial positions used to justify pretrial detention, and reasoning that a District of Columbia detention
statute "marked a substantial departure from the traditional rationale underlying pretrial
detention"). Courts have advanced two rationales in support of pretrial detention, both of
which were aimed at protecting the integrity of the judicial process. See French, supra, at
193. Courts usually order pretrial detention when there exists a risk that a defendant will
jump bail or tamper with the jury or witnesses. See id.
The regulatory powers of both the federal and state governments to detain individuals
for the health and safety of society are broad. See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S.
366, 375 (1956) (upholding a federal Act that provided for the indefinite commitment of a
defendant found to be both mentally incompetent to stand trial and dangerous); In re
Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (asserting that the State of California possessed broad discretion in deciding whether to quarantine an individual suffering from a contagious disease).
See generally Richards, supra note 3, at 338-39 (commenting that the Supreme Court has
recognized a state's authority under its police powers to confine individuals in order to
control criminal behavior). But see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (invali-
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that also appears to regulate anti-social behavior, courts must decide if
the legislation is sufficiently punitive in nature to trigger constitutional
safeguards reserved for criminal defendants under the Double Jeopardy
and Ex Post Facto Clauses.5 Furthermore, a judicial determination that a
dating a state procedure authorizing the indefinite commitment of a defendant based
solely on his mental incapacity to stand trial). Commentators have argued that society
generally disapproves of any form of preventive detention regardless of the chances that
an individual may commit a violent crime. See Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to
Sexual Predators:Community Notification and Civil Commitment, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405, 414 (1997). Civil commitment of the dangerously insane has been the one exception. See id. The justification for accepting civil commitment
as constitutionally less offensive than other forms of preventive detention is the notion
that the mentally ill lack the ability to think rationally, and, therefore, actually appreciate
a reduced amount of individual liberty. See id.
5. See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil
Law Distinction,42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1329-30 (1991) (noting that the Bill of Rights affords more procedural protections to defendants in criminal cases than in civil cases). The
main goal of the criminal justice system is to exact retribution from the offender through
incarceration. See Cheh, supra, at 1332; see also Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear
the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalizationand the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses,
46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1543 (1997) (describing a "criminal" sanction as one that punishes
the offender through imprisonment, criminal fines, and probation). A civil or regulatory
statute, however, seeks primarily to compensate the plaintiff and deter future illegal conduct. See Green, supra, at 1542. But see Cheh, supra, at 1354 (commenting that many
criminal and civil proceedings promote similar goals such as "compensation, deterrence,
rehabilitation, treatment and protection, coercion to perform specific acts, and retribution"). Moreover, the characterization of a statute as "civil" or "criminal" will determine
whether the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses even apply. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (1997) (emphasizing that an essential prerequisite to both
double jeopardy and ex post facto claims is the determination of whether a law is punitive
in nature); see also Stephen R. McAllister, The Constitutionalityof Kansas Laws Targeting
Sex Offenders, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 419, 454-55 (1997) (recognizing that the central question concerning the constitutionality of sex offender commitment statutes is whether such
laws are characterized as "criminal" or "civil"); Prevention Versus Punishment,supra note
3, at 1712 (recharacterizing the distinction as the classification between "preventive" and
"punitive"). Not only is the characterization of a law as punitive or preventive crucial to a
determination of whether double jeopardy and ex post facto protections apply, but it also
may generate an inquiry into the availability of other constitutional safeguards in a judicial
proceeding. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-55 (1980) (addressing whether a
civil penalty was sufficiently punitive in nature to trigger the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 368 (1970) (holding that juvenile delinquency proceedings required the reasonable doubt standard of proof
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause for an adult defendant in a criminal case); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967) (concluding that juveniles were entitled to due process protections in delinquency proceedings due to the risk of incarceration following such proceedings); Cheh, supra, at 1329-30 (noting that civil proceedings do not implicate the full
panoply of constitutional protections required in criminal prosecutions); Raquel Blacher,
Comment, HistoricalPerspective of the "Sex Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionary
Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 902 (1995) (commenting
that the various constitutional challenges to sex psychopath statutes generally have failed
due to judicial determinations that these laws are preventive rather than punitive in na-
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statute is merely preventive or regulatory, rather than punitive, necessarily precludes any claim based on double jeopardy or ex post facto
principles.6
Only a legislative enactment that is punitive will support double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.7 Courts, however, have encountered difficulty in developing a uniform and workable method for making such determinations.8 State autonomy considerations, recognized in police
ture).
6. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085-86 (declining to reach the merits of the defendant's double jeopardy and ex post facto claims due to the non-punitive nature of the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); see also G. Scott Rafshoon, Comment, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of Punishment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44
EMORY L.J. 1633, 1643 (1995) (commenting that if community notification statutes are not
found to impose an additional punishment on released sex offenders, then they "simply
represent a collateral consequence of an offender's conviction" and do not violate the
Constitution). Although a determination that a law is non-punitive bars further inquiry
along double jeopardy or ex post facto lines, a punitive characterization does not always
translate into a constitutional violation. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that a punitive finding does not necessarily render a civil statute
criminal for constitutional purposes). Justice Breyer acknowledged that similarities between civil commitment and criminal confinement laws-such as the goals of confinement
and incapacitation-were not enough to turn a civil commitment into criminal punishment. See id.; see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149 (noting that sufficient grounds did not exist to render civil forfeiture statutes punitive within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause merely because they had some connection to criminal activity); Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1986) (stating that involuntary civil commitment does not automatically guarantee the entire range of procedural protections guaranteed to criminal defendants).
7. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085; see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 40204 (1938) (indicating that laws which impose criminal sanctions raise double jeopardy issues, but that "civil enforcement of a remedial sanction" does not); Daniel L. Feldman,
The "Scarlet Letter Laws" of the 1990s: A Response to Critics,60 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1085
(1997) (explaining that the applicability of the ex post facto prohibition to sex offender
laws depends on whether the community notification requirements constitute punishment); Elga A. Goodman, Comment, Megan's Law: The New Jersey Supreme Court Navigates UnchartedWaters, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 764, 782 (1996) (noting that the constitutionality of the registration and community notification provisions of the state's sex
offender statute hinges on a resolution of the law's punitive nature).
8. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 629-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that although the retroactive notification provisions contained in New York's sex offender statute were sufficiently punitive to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the registration requirements within the same statute were preventive and, therefore, constitutional), affid in
part,rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court's holding
regarding the constitutionality of the retroactive notification provisions), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1066 (1998). In Ursery, the Supreme Court reversed two circuit court decisions and
held that civil forfeiture did not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138-39, rev'g 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), and
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, conflicting decisions regarding the constitutionality of sex offender statutes represent additional proof that courts have failed to formulate a reliable test for determining whether a
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power jurisprudence, clash with constitutional limitations on punishment
embodied in the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. 9 In fact,
the conflict between a state's authority to regulate individuals under its
police powers and constitutional restraints on punishment has been nowhere more pronounced than in the area of repeat sex offender legisla-

sanction is punitive for double jeopardy, and ex post facto purposes. See, e.g., Young v.
Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 754 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (invalidating the state's sexually violent
predator law on the grounds that it was punitive within the meaning of the Due Process,
Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1380
(D. Alaska 1994) (concluding that the retroactive public dissemination provisions of the
state's sex offender Registration Act constituted an ex post facto punishment); Artway v.
Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.N.J. 1.995) (finding the registration provisions of the state's sex offender statute constitutional, but holding that the notification
provisions imposed punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause), affd in part,vacated in part on other grounds, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217,
1223-24 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc) (upholding as preventive rather than punitive a statute requiring released sex offenders to register their name and address with the police); Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 404 (N.J. 1995) (holding that retroactive application of the public
notification provision of the state's sex offender statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting an ex post
facto attack on the public notification provisions of the state's sex offender law); Prevention Versus Punishment, supra note 3, at 1711-12 (noting that jurisdictional splits on the
constitutionality of sex offender registration and notification statutes stemmed from the
courts' lack of a comprehensive means of determining whether the laws were punitive).
The Supreme Court's punitive/preventive jurisprudence has been severely criticized because tests developed under the doctrine were unreliable and produced inconsistent results. See Daniel A. Allen, Note, To Punish or To Remedy-That Is the Constitutional
Question: Double Jeopardy Confusion in State v. Hansen, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 235,
235-36 (1996) (discussing the confusion among states concerning which test to apply when
analyzing the punitive nature of a statute); see also infra Part I (discussing various tests
developed by the Supreme Court to resolve whether a statute is "criminal" or "civil").
9. See Richards, supra note 3, at 338. While a state may enact laws encroaching on
individual liberty in order to prevent future harm, it may not punish an individual pursuant to its police powers. See id.; see also Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1266 (2d Cir. 1997)
(addressing whether the public notification scheme of the state's sex offender law, designed to safeguard the public from future sex crimes, constituted punishment in violation
of the Ex Post Facto Clause), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); Iowa v. Pickens, 558
N.W.2d 396, 400 (Iowa 1997) (classifying the state's sex offender registration law as a legitimate police power measure and not an ex post facto law); Allen, supra note 8, at 236,
270 (analyzing whether administrative license revocation statutes, enacted as a means to
protect the public from drunk drivers, inflicted punishment within the meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause); Lawrence Taylor, Make It a Single: DUI Dual PunishmentMay
Be Unconstitutional,L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 7, 1995, at 7 (discussing various state court decisions barring criminal prosecutions for DUI under the Double Jeopardy Clause when administrative sanctions already had been imposed). A state's parens patriae and police
powers are derived from the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution which states that
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.; see also Blacher, supra note 5, at 901 (asserting that the Tenth Amendment is
the source of a state's parenspatriaeand police powers).
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tion. '° In response to public outrage and panic surrounding violent sex

10. See Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, Comment, The Child Sex Offender Registration
Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the
Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 788, 814-15 (1996) (noting that a
state's authority to regulate certain released sex offenders through child sex offender registration laws is limited by "guaranteed individual rights enumerated in the Constitution");
supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing various decisions regarding the punitive
nature of sex offender laws); see also Brief for Respondent and Cross Petitioner at 25,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (arguing that the state's sexual
predator law attempted to undermine the "ex post facto and double jeopardy prohibitions
by cloaking an incapacitative purpose behind the State's parens patriaepower to provide
treatment"); Feldman, supra note 7, at 1083 (noting that the constitutionality of sex offender notification laws has encountered acute criticism from courts and legal scholars);
Teir & Coy, supra note 4, at 412 (explaining that the majority of the constitutional challenges to registration and community notification provisions embodied in sex offender
laws spring from allegations that they constitute impermissible punishment); Eva M. Rodriguez, Court Reviews Sex Offenders' Fate, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 2, 1996, at 10 (noting that
criminal defense lawyers have argued that civilly confining sexual predators after they
have served their prison sentences is merely a ploy to punish them twice).
Recently, states and the federal government have mixed civil and criminal sanctions to
provide a check on antisocial behavior. See Cheh, supra note 5, at 1325 (explaining that
the idea of combining civil and criminal laws to prohibit criminal behavior, although not
new, never before has been advanced to such lengths). States have employed civil sanctions in order to curb "domestic violence, drug trafficking, weapons possession, and racial
harassment." Id. at 1326; see also Jay A. Rosenberg, Note, ConstitutionalRights and Civil
Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 390, 391 (1988) (commenting that law enforcement
agencies favor the use of civil forfeiture actions particularly in drunk driving and drug trafficking cases). Commentators have argued that punishing criminal behavior through civil
rather than criminal sanctions offers significant advantages to police and prosecutors. See
PETER FINN & MARIA O'BRIEN HYLTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING CIVIL
REMEDIES FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: RATIONALE, CASE STUDIES, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 2-3 (Oct. 1994) (noting that the advantages of punishing offenders through the civil justice system include the fact that fewer procedural protections
are offered to defendants in civil proceedings than in criminal proceedings, making trials
easier and quicker); see also Cheh, supra note 5, at 1329. Evidence of this trend toward
avenging criminal behavior through civil laws exists in a majority of the states which now
have some form of sex offender registration and notification law. See Child Molester's
Suicide Rouses Little Sympathy Among Lawmen, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 16,
1998, at 2 (reporting that all fifty states have laws requiring sex offenders to register with
law enforcement agencies); Robert Schwaneberg, Megan's Law Takes Many Diverse
Paths, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 25, 1998, at 1 (noting that only Kentucky, Nebraska, and New Mexico do not provide for community notification of a sex offender's
whereabouts). Although specific provisions of such laws differ from state to state, they all
require a released sex offender to register his address with the local police. See EarlHubbard, supra, at 791. Moreover, in May 1996, Congress enacted a federal sex offender
registration and notification law and mandated that the states enact similar statutes or lose
state funds reserved for crime prevention. See Megan's Law of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-145,
110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending § 170101(d) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d)); see also EarlHubbard, supra, at 799 (noting that under the federal guidelines, state laws must allow the
police to release a sex offender's registration information when it is necessary for the pro-
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crimes perpetrated by released sexual predators," states have passed
laws, under the guise of their parens patriae and police powers, aimed at
safeguarding the community from the dangers of repeated sexual vio-

lence. 2 As a result of the trend toward more stringent laws restricting
the freedom of released sex offenders, courts have been forced to address whether these laws violate the limitations on criminal punishment
in the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.13
tection of the community); Feldman, supra note 7, at 1083 (discussing the requirements of
the federal scheme).
11. See Sarah H. Francis, Note, Sexually Dangerous Person Statutes: Constitutional
Protections of Society and the Mentally Ill or Emotionally-Driven Punishment?, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 125, 125-26 (1995) (stating that intense media coverage of violent sex
crimes, combined with public outcries for greater police protection from released sex offenders, encouraged state legislatures to enact "sexually dangerous persons" laws). In
Washington State, public anger following the rape of a seven-year old boy by a released
sex offender exerted pressure on the state legislature to take steps to minimize the chances
of a reoccurrence of this type of crime. See James Popkin et al., Natural Born Predators,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 64, 66 (describing the events leading up to
the enactment of Washington State's sex offender law).
12. See McAllister, supra note 5, at 419-21 (noting that state legislatures have attempted to address the problem of released recidivist sex offenders through three different
measures: imposing "longer sentences for first-time and repeat sex offenders;" providing
for community notification and registration laws for released sex offenders; and enacting
involuntary civil confinement laws). In response to the brutal rape and murder of sevenyear old Megan Kanka, New Jersey enacted the first sexual offender notification act,
commonly referred to as "Megan's Law." See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 11 (West
1995) (requiring that released sex offenders register their whereabouts with police, who in
turn, notify the community that a convicted sex offender lives in their neighborhood); see
also Robert Schwaneberg, Megan's Law Clears Last Hurdle: Supreme Court Declines to
Hear Challenge, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 24, 1998, at 1 (noting that the rape
and murder of Megan acted as the impetus for the enactment of Megan's Law). Megan's
confessed rapist and murderer, Jesse Timmendequas, lured Megan into his house and then
strangled her with a belt. See Rafshoon, supra note 6, at 1633 n.1; see also Jan Hoffman,
New Law Is Urged on Freed Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1994, at B1 (describing
the circumstances surrounding Megan's rape and murder). Believing that their daughter's
murder may have been prevented had they known that a convicted sex offender resided
across the street, Megan's parents lobbied the state and federal legislatures to pass laws
that would notify the public when a repeat sex offender moved into their community. See
Schwaneberg, supra, at 1. Other states have enacted legislation similar to New Jersey's
Megan's Law. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-c (McKinney Supp. 1997) (requiring released sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies, followed by community notification of the offender's neighborhood address); see also ALASKA STAT. §
12.63.010 (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West Supp. 1997); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(h) (West Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, § 37 (West
1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-87 (West Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1997).
13. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086 (concluding that the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act did not constitute punishment and, thus, did not violate the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing
conflicting judicial decisions regarding the constitutionality of sex offender laws under the
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses); supra note 12 and accompanying text (de-
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In an effort to reconcile the constitutional tensions created by laws intertwining punishment and prevention, the Supreme Court developed a
two-pronged test to determine whether a statute was more punitive than
preventive. 4 Under the first prong, the Court examined whether the
legislature intended to create a civil rather than a criminal law. 5 Under
the second prong, the Court evaluated the statute in light of seven criteria traditionally utilized to calculate a law's punitive effect.'6 Initially, the
scribing state sex offender registration and notification statutes).
14. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (noting that the
Court would consider two criteria when analyzing whether a statute was punitive or regulatory in nature: whether the legislature intended to create a punitive sanction and
whether the sanction actually had the effect of punishing the offender). If the legislature
clearly evinced a punitive intent, the Court would regard the statute as punitive and decline to examine the statute's effects under the second prong of the test. See id. Where,
however, the legislature intended to create a civil sanction, the Court would apply the second prong of the test to determine whether the law actually amounted to punishment. See
id.; see also Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493 (1997) (asserting that where the
legislature intended to establish a civil sanction, the Court would ask whether the sanction
"was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transfor[m] what was clearly intended as
a civil remedy into a criminal penalty") (internal quotations omitted); Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at
2147 (stating that when resolving whether a sanction is punitive or preventive, courts must
inquire into the legislature's purpose in enacting the law and the law's effect on offenders);
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (commenting that despite the legislature's intention to impose a civil penalty on offenders, the Court would nonetheless consider the law punitive if it inflicted punishment); Prevention Versus Punishment, supra
note 3, at 1719-21 (analyzing decisions in which courts have characterized laws as punitive
or preventive based on an examination of legislative intent and the statute's punitive effects).
15. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (1997) (considering first whether the Kansas
legislature intended to provide a civil non-punitive penalty); Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 (emphasizing that the Court must first examine whether the legislature intended to enact a
civil or criminal penalty); Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 146, 169 (finding that Congress clearly intended to punish draft-dodgers through a law stripping them of their citizenship); Pataki,
940 F. Supp. at 604-05 (examining whether the legislature merely intended to protect the
public from certain released sex offenders through a law providing for community notification of the offender's whereabouts or also desired to punish such offenders).
16. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69. The Kennedy Court required an evaluation of
these seven factors when doubt existed as to whether the legislature contemplated a punitive or merely regulatory law. See id.; infra Part I (listing the seven factors of Kennedy);
see also Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 672 (D.N.J. 1995) (stating that
a court must analyze the effects of a statute by applying the criteria prescribed in Kennedy
"even if the stated purpose of the legislation is a regulatory or procedural one"), affd in
part, vacated in part on other grounds, 81 F.3d 1235, 1250 (3d Cir. 1996); Earl-Hubbard,
supra note 10, at 817 n.197 (noting that the seven factors of Kennedy "are still an appropriate source of information when weighing a law's purpose and its effect"). But see Ward,
448 U.S. at 249 (stating that the seven factors provided in Kennedy are not dispositive, but
may be useful in determining the remedial or punitive nature of the law); Doe v. Poritz,
662 A.2d 367, 402 (N.J. 1995) (rejecting the use of the seven factors to determine whether
a law constitutes punishment); Feldman, supra note 7, at 1087-89 (criticizing the application of the seven factors to determine the punitive nature of a sanction).
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Court applied this two-pronged punitive/preventive test to limit states'
rights to regulate their citizens under general police powers. Under this
application, the Court rejected the concept that a legislature's own determination that a statute was "civil" provided conclusive evidence that
the law was non-punitive in nature. 7 Later decisions by the Court, however, signified a transformation of the two-pronged test."' Under this
version of the test, the Court employed an approach which was more
deferential to the legislature's own characterization of its statute as nonpunitive.19

17. Compare Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (examining the legislative history of both
the challenged statute and past citizenship forfeiture laws to determine if the legislature
intended a punitive law), with Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 (stating that the determination of
whether a statute is civil or criminal is a matter of "statutory construction," and a legislature's preference for a civil "label" is strong evidence that the law is non-punitive); see also
Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 604-05 (regarding certain statements made by legislators concerning the passage of the state's sex offender notification law indicative of a legislative intent
to punish sex offenders despite the law's civil label); Porter, supra note 2, at 552 (noting
the distinction between the Kennedy Court's focus on Congress's intent to punish offenders in determining whether a law was "civil" or "criminal," and the Ward Court's mere
acceptance of a civil "label" attached to a law as sufficient evidence that the legislature did
not intend to punish).
18. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (stating that under the first prong, the Court would
defer to Congress's preference for a civil label as proof of a non-punitive intent, and, under the second prong, the Court would regard the seven factors of Kennedy as merely
"helpful" in determining whether a sanction had a punitive effect). The Ward Court declined to search a putatively civil sanction's legislative history for an unexpressed legislative intent to punish. See id.; see also United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d
1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (asserting that under the Ward test, "[i]f Congress indicated a
preference that the proceeding be denominated 'civil' rather than 'criminal,' the Court
would defer to that preference except in extraordinary circumstances."), rev'd, United
States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1997). Moreover, the Ward Court increased the burden
on the moving party under the second prong to show that a law had the actual effect of
punishing offenders despite the legislature's intention to the contrary. See Ward, 448 U.S.
at 248-49 (stating that, under the second prong, "only the clearest proof" of a statute's punitive purpose or effect would suffice to transform a civil sanction into a criminal sanction)
(internal quotations omitted); Porter, supra note 2, at 548 & n.161 (describing this modified test as placing a heavy burden on defendants to establish that a civil sanction was actually criminal); see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148 (noting that the civil forfeiture statute
would fail under the second prong only if the Court found the "clearest proof" that the law
was so punitive in effect to override Congress's non-punitive intent); United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984) (employing the deferential twopronged test used in Ward to determine whether a civil law was punitive).
19. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249. Rather than question whether Congress intended to
enact a punitive sanction by examining a law's legislative history, the Ward Court simply
deferred to the "civil" label attached to the law as conclusive evidence that Congress
meant to create a non-punitive sanction. Compare id. (finding a civil label indicative of
Congress's non-punitive intent), with Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 (examining the legislative
history of forfeiture of citizenship laws to determine if an underlying legislative purpose to
punish existed). Moreover, in order for the seven Kennedy factors to lead to a punitive

1998]

Kansas v. Hendricks

1155

Despite its adoption of the two-pronged approach as the primary
framework by which to test a statute's penal nature, 0 the Supreme Court
altered its analysis when the challenged legislation was a civil involuntary

commitment statute.21 Rather than rely on the legislature's "civil" classifinding, the factors had to establish by the "clearest proof" that the law was punitive. See
Ward, 448 U.S. at 249; see also Jochner, supra note 1, at 72 (discussing the deferential test
utilized by the Court to analyze whether a penalty was punitive or preventive in nature);
Porter, supra note 2, at 552 (arguing that the test under Kennedy is considerably less deferential to the state legislature than the Ward test). The deferential statutory construction, originating from a 1938 Supreme Court double jeopardy case, focused on Congress's
intent as the benchmark for determining the civil or criminal nature of a sanction. See
Jochner, supra note 1, at 72. "As a result of employing this deferential test, the Court had
never invalidated a legislatively authorized successive punishment as violative of the double jeopardy clause." Id. This early deferential statutory construction test eventually
evolved into the Ward and Kennedy two-pronged punitive/preventive test. See id.
Although the Court frequently has applied the Kennedy-Ward two-pronged test to assess the punitive or non-punitive nature of a law, the Court also has developed other tests
for this same purpose. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (stating that
in determining whether a civil sanction constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes, courts must ask whether the sanction served either a retributive or deterrent purpose or solely a remedial one); see also Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767, 800 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that before the Halper decision,
the Court had never struck down a legislatively authorized second punishment as a double
jeopardy violation); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993) (reaffirming the
Halper test and holding that a civil forfeiture proceeding that was not solely remedial
comprised punishment); $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1218 (noting that the
Court's decision in Halper signified a rejection of the Ward test), rev'd, United States v.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). Despite the fact that many courts have applied the Halper
punitive/preventive test to analyze whether a statute violated either double jeopardy or ex
post facto principles, the Court has discredited this test. See Hudson v. United States, 118
S. Ct. 488, 494 (1997) (regarding the Halper approach as an "unworkable" test for double
jeopardy purposes); see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2143-46 (1996) (restricting the applicability of the Halper test to statutes involving fixed monetary civil penalties); Allen, supra
note 8, at 262-65 (arguing that Nebraska's administrative license revocation statute should
be analyzed according to the Kennedy-Ward two-pronged punitive/preventive test rather
than the Halper test, as Halper did not apply outside the context of monetary penalties);
David G. Savage, Double Trouble, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 39, 40 (discussing the Hudson
Court's rejection of the Halpertest).
20. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493, 495-96 (applying the Ward two-pronged test to determine whether the imposition of a monetary penalty on the defendant for bank fraud
constituted punishment); Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142 (reaffirming the two-pronged analysis
developed in Ward); see also Allen, supra note 8, at 264-65 (discussing the Ursery holding
and concluding that "[t]he two-step Kennedy-Ward test applies to a relatively wide variety
of cases").
21. Cf. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (discussing the role of treatment of
individuals confined under involuntary commitment proceedings as an indication of the
non-punitive goal of the statute); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426, 428 & n.4
(1979) (emphasizing that when a state offers treatment to individuals committed under an
involuntary commitment law, it is not exercising its parens patriae and police powers in a
punitive sense). In Addington, the Court recognized that a state may commit a mentally ill
and dangerous individual against his or her will pursuant to its parens patriae and police
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fication of a statute as the hallmark of a truly non-punitive intent, the
Court applied a new analysis.22 Under this analysis, the Court regarded
involuntary commitment treatment provisions more indicative of a legislature's non-punitive intent.23
In Kansas v. Hendricks,2 the Supreme Court applied the deferential
two-pronged punitive/preventive test to determine the constitutionality
of a sex offender commitment statute 5 The Court specifically addressed
the application of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act26 to a repeat
sex offender, Leroy Hendricks, who was nearing the end of a ten-year
prison term. In order to prevent Hendricks's release, the State of Kanpowers. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. Moreover, the Court recognized that such civil
commitment proceedings were distinct from criminal prosecutions because the state was
not exercising these powers in a punitive manner. See id. at 428. In order to determine
whether proceedings under the involuntary commitment statute were non-punitive for the
purpose of implicating procedural due process safeguards, the Court highlighted the importance of the role of treatment in the punitive/preventive analysis. See id. at 428 & n.4.
22. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 367, 369-70 (agreeing with the Illinois Supreme Court's determination that the essential aim of the Illinois sexual predator act was to provide treatment, not punishment, to those who were involuntarily committed); State v. Turner, 556
S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. 1977) (recognizing several distinctions between proceedings for civil
commitment and criminal incarceration, including the fact that involuntarily committed
patients are entitled to treatment and may be released when they are deemed not dangerous to society, whereas convicted criminals are committed for a set term); McAllister, supra note 5, at 455-56 (discussing the Allen Court's reliance on treatment as the principal
basis upon which it found the Act non-punitive); Prevention Versus Punishment, supra
note 3, at 1727 (arguing that commitment laws must be scrutinized to determine whether
their "primary effect is treatment of the affected individual, or satisfaction of the societal
interest in locking sex offenders up and throwing away the key"). But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084-85 (1997) (noting that a state may civilly confine an individual
who is both mentally ill and dangerous for the purpose of continued incapacitation and not
for the purpose of providing treatment).
23. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 369-70; see also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113-14
(1966) (maintaining that there are significant distinctions between institutions administered by the Department of Corrections and a state's civil mental hospital); Richards, supra note 3, at 374 (noting that when a law provides for treatment in addition to confinement, the law cannot be "wholly punitive"). But see Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (stating
that a need for treatment did not have to represent a state's "overriding" objective in civilly confining sexually violent predators).
24. 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997).
25. See id. at 2081-82.
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-17 (Supp. 1997). The Act defines a "sexually violent predator" as a person "who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes
the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence, if not confined in a
secure facility." Id. § 59-29a02(a). Examples of what the statute considers "a sexually
violent offense" include: rape, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, sodomy, aggravated indecent solicitation of a child, sexual exploitation of a child, and aggravated sexual
battery. See id. § 59-29a02(e)(1)-(9).
27. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076 (noting that the first time Kansas used the Act
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sas successfully petitioned the district court to civilly confine Hendricks
as a sexually violent predator.2,
On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Hendricks claimed that the
Act violated the Federal Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post
Facto Clauses.29 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Act violated
Hendricks's substantive due process rights because it provided for the
civil commitment of individuals who were not mentally ill. 0 The Suwas to commit Hendricks). Hendricks was serving time on a 1984 conviction for taking
"indecent liberties" with two thirteen-year-old boys. See id. at 2078. The Act was adopted
at the "urging of an Ad Hoc Sexual Offender Task Force" led by the grieving parents of
Stephanie Schmidt, a Kansas college student who was raped and murdered in 1993 by a
convicted rapist who had been released from jail. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 140
(Kan. 1996) (Larson, J., dissenting) (describing the impetus behind the enactment of the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act), rev'd, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997);
see also McAllister, supra note 5, at 419-20 (describing the factual events leading up to the
enactment of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act).
28. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078-79. Under the Act, the Kansas Attorney General, after receiving notice of the impending release of a potential sexually violent predator, has seventy-five days to file a petition seeking additional confinement. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04 (Supp. 1996). After the petition is filed, the district court has sixty
days to hold a trial to determine whether the individual is a "sexually violent predator"
within the meaning of the Act. See id. § 59-29a06. If the jury finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person is a sexually violent predator, then the person is "committed to the
custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so
changed that the person is safe to be at large." Id. § 59-29a07(a). At Hendricks's trial, he
testified to his repeated acts of child sexual molestation and abuse. See Hendricks, 117 S.
Ct. at 2078. Hendricks revealed that he had begun molesting children in 1955 when he
exposed himself to two adolescent girls. See id. Since that time, the state convicted and
jailed Hendricks three more times for criminal sexual conduct towards children. See id.
Also, while Hendricks was incarcerated, the state attempted to treat him for his sexual deviance. See id. After his release from a psychiatric hospital in 1965, however, Hendricks
molested again resulting in yet another conviction and further incarceration. See id. Hendricks refused all treatment offered to him for his pedophilia. See id. Nonetheless, Kansas
again released him and while on parole Hendricks molested his stepdaughter and stepson.
See id. In response to Hendricks's repeated sexual misconduct, Kansas sought involuntary
civil confinement. See id. Hendricks admitted at trial that when not confined, he abuses
children. See id. at 2078. He stated that "the only sure way he could keep from sexually
abusing children in the future was 'to die."' Id. A jury found that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator and therefore, qualified for commitment under the Act. See id. at
2079.
29. See id.
30. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138. The Supreme Court of Kansas reasoned that
the statute ran afoul of the well-established principle that commitment of an individual
under a civil statute must be premised on proof that the individual is both mentally ill and
dangerous. See id.; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992) (explaining that a
state only may civilly confine a person who is both mentally ill and dangerous). The
Foucha Court reasoned that the Constitution did not permit the state to civilly confine the
defendant based on his "antisocial personality" and his dangerousness to himself or others. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78; see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1983)
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preme Court granted certiorari to resolve Hendricks's constitutional
claims." The Court reversed the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court
and held that the Act did not violate Hendricks's substantive due process
rights.32 The Court also rejected Hendricks's double jeopardy and ex
post facto challenges, finding that the Act was non-punitive in nature.3
By concluding that the Act was non-punitive in nature, the Court adhered to the deferential two-pronged punitive/preventive test established
in earlier cases. 4 The Court, deferring to the Act's "civil" label, concluded that the Kansas legislature intended to create a non-punitive
scheme for the confinement of sexually violent predators.35 Moreover, in
(holding that a verdict of guilt by reason of insanity satisfied the necessary requirements
that the person sought to be committed was both mentally ill and dangerous); Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (stating that the clear and convincing evidence standard
is "constitutionally adequate" for determining whether the person sought to be committed
is mentally ill and dangerous). But see Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080 (asserting that Kansas's requirement that an individual suffer from a "mental abnormality" or "personality
disorder" fulfilled the "mental illness" prerequisite under Foucha).
31. See id. at 2076.
32. See id. at 2076, 2081 (holding that a diagnosis of Hendricks as a pedophile qualified as a "mental abnormality" under the Act and, therefore, commitment did not violate
Hendricks's due process rights). Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hendricks
found that Hendricks's substantive due process rights had not been violated through application of the Act's pre-commitment requirement that he suffer from a "mental abnormality." See id. at 2081; id. at 2087-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Acknowledging that a
finding of dangerousness alone was not enough to justify involuntary civil commitment,
the Court noted that dangerousness coupled with a "mental abnormality" or "personality
disorder" provided a sufficient basis for involuntary civil commitment. See id. at 2080.
The Court further noted that the states had the power to define "terms of a medical nature
that have legal significance." Id. at 2081.
33. See id. at 2085-86 (explaining that because the Act was non-punitive in nature, the
Court did not need to reach the substance of Hendricks's double jeopardy and ex post
facto claims); see also In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 153-54 (Larson, J., dissenting) (arguing
that due to the Act's civil nature, it did not violate either double jeopardy or ex post facto
principles). Hendricks advanced a three-part argument for why the Act was punitive and
therefore violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses: his confinement under
the Act could be indefinite; the proceedings established under the Act more closely resembled criminal proceedings; and the Act did not provide any treatment for pedophiles.
See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083; see also Paul Butler, It's Hard to Object to Committing
Sexual Predators,But a Lot of the Rest of Us Are Abnormal Too, LEGAL TIMES, July 14,
1997, at S43 (detailing Hendricks's argument).
34. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-83 (stating that the Court must first determine
the legislature's expressed intent in creating the penalty, and if such intent was "civil," the
Court must then determine whether clear proof existed to eviscerate the legislature's intent) (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)); see also Porter, supra
note 2, at 552 (commenting that the punitive/preventive test developed in Ward is substantially more deferential than earlier applications of the test).
35. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (noting that "[n]othing on the face of the statute
suggest[ed] that the legislature sought to create anything other than a civil commitment
scheme designed to protect the public from harm").
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a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy highlighted the treatment provisions contained in the Act as evidence that the law served non-punitive
goals.36
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer reasoned that the Act violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.37 Finding that the treatment provisions embodied in the Act veiled an underlying intent to punish Hendricks a second time, the dissent concluded that Kansas had created a punitive penalty."
This Note first examines the Supreme Court's development of a twopronged test to determine whether a statute is punitive within the
meaning of the Constitution. Next, this Note traces the Court's shift, under both prongs of the punitive/preventive test, in favor of a more deferential stance toward legislative labels. This Note then discusses the
Court's emphasis on the role of treatment as an essential ingredient in
the punitive/preventive doctrine's application to involuntary civil commitment statutes. Finally, this Note analyzes the majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions in Kansas v. Hendricks and concludes that the
Court has extended the application of the deferential two-pronged test to
civil involuntary commitment laws.
I. THE PUNITIVE/PREVENTIVE DOCTRINE:
EVOLUTION OF THE Two-PRONGED TEST

The Supreme Court's punitive/preventive jurisprudence evolved in the
context of a variety of constitutional challenges. 9 Although the Court
36. See id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also warned that if
Kansas had adopted the treatment provisions as a "sham or mere pretext," then a finding
that the Act was punitive would necessarily follow. See id.
37. See id. at 2087-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the
Act's definition of mental abnormality did not offend substantive due process, but nonetheless interpreting the Act as punitive and, therefore, violative of the Ex Post Facto
Clause).
38. See id. at 2088; see also Brief for Respondent and Cross Petitioner at 25, Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (arguing that Kansas attempted to circumvent ex post facto and double jeopardy limitations on punishment by disguising its law
as a parenspatriaemeasure designed to provide treatment).
39. See, e.g., Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085-86 (analyzing the constitutionality of the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act under the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 437, 452 (1989) (determining that the imposition of a civil penalty for the filing of false medicare claims, following a criminal conviction for the same offense, constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes); DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 145, 160 (1960) (finding that a state law preventing
convicted felons from holding union offices was non-punitive, and, therefore, did not
amount to an unconstitutional ex post facto law or bill of attainder); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86. 97, 101 (1958) (examining whether a federal statute that penalized convicted war
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has recognized that states may regulate the conduct of their citizens for
the good of society under their parens patriae and police powers, it also
has interpreted the Constitution to restrict a state's ability to punish individuals." In order to maintain such a delicate balance, the Court has attempted to develop an analytical framework which respects both the
states' authority to regulate individuals and the constitutional guarantees
against certain kinds of punishment.41
A. The Role of Legislative Intent and the Seven-Factors Test in the
Punitive/PreventiveInquiry: Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
The punitive/preventive doctrine emerged in response to legislative attempts to punish individuals through civil sanctions. 4' Early in the evolution of the doctrine, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that it was
called upon to balance two competing interests: Congress's power to
regulate citizens and constitutional restraints on Congress's ability to
punish through the civil law system.43 The Court embraced a punideserters by stripping them of their citizenship violated the Eighth Amendment); United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-15 (1946) (concluding that a federal law barring certain
individuals from government employment due to their political beliefs was punitive within
the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause).
40. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(asserting that when a state exercises its parens patriaepower to protect society from persons deemed mentally ill and dangerous, "an inevitable consequence... is that the ward's
personal freedom will be substantially restrained"); see also supra notes 3-6, 9 and accompanying text (noting that although the states and the federal government maintain broad
power to regulate individuals, the Constitution protects citizens from governmental encroachments upon specific enumerated fundamental freedoms).
41. See McAllister, supra note 5, at 458 (commenting that traditionally the Court has
respected the states' choices in blending the civil commitment and criminal justice systems); see also Cheh, supra note 5, at 1327 (identifying areas of the law which favor the
dual use of civil and criminal sanctions to redress criminal conduct); Lynn C. Hall, Note,
Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial Justice and Prohibited Punishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause-United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989),
65 WASH. L. REV. 437, 452 (1990) (discussing the inherent difficulties in combining the
civil and criminal systems). Justice Kennedy, concurring in Hendricks, questioned the
propriety of using the civil system rather than the criminal system to further confine sexually violent predators when such confinement could be for life. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring). At least one commentator has argued that decisions
under the Court's modern punitive/preventive jurisprudence have broadened a state's
power to restrict individual liberty for the common good. See Richards, supra note 3, at
331.
42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional issues presented when the civil justice system operates as a vehicle to control criminal behavior).
43. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 163-64 (1963) (analyzing
whether two federal Acts, imposing the penalty of forfeiture of citizenship on war deserters, violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). Writing for the majority, Justice Goldberg
stated:
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tive/preventive analysis that favored a broad application of44 constitutional
prohibitions on Congress's authority to enact punishment.
45
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court developed a
two-pronged test to determine whether two federal statutes were primarily penal in nature, therefore, triggering procedural due process protections guaranteed by the Constitution." Kennedy stemmed from the
application of the Nationality Act of 194047 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195248 to two male citizens who lived outside of the
United States in order to avoid military service during wartime. 49 As
punishment for violating provisions that made it a crime to remain outside the country for the purpose of evading the draft, the government
stripped both men of their United States citizenship.0 The Supreme
We have come to the conclusion that there is a basic question in the present
cases, the answer to which obviates a choice here between the powers of Congress and the constitutional guarantee of citizenship. That issue is whether the
statutes here, which automatically--without prior court or administrative proceedings-impose forfeiture of citizenship, are essentially penal in character, and
consequently have deprived the appellees of their citizenship without due process
of law ....
Id.
44. Compare id. at 160,167 (engaging in an exhaustive examination of the legislative
history of citizenship forfeiture laws to determine whether the law at issue was punitive),
with United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (explaining that the question of
whether a statute is civil or criminal depended, in part, upon which label Congress chose
to place on the face of the law). But see Porter, supra note 2, at 548 (commenting that in
practice the Court has ignored the long recognized rule that a "legislature[] cannot... deny a defendant the constitutional protections" by merely labeling a criminal law
"civil").
45. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
46. See id. at 164 (stating that if the statutory provisions were found to be penal in
nature, then the Fifth and Sixth Amendments required the application of procedural due
process protections); see also Porter, supra note 2, at 550-52 (noting that under the Kennedy two-pronged test, the Court first asked whether Congress intended to punish and,
then, absent strong evidence of a punitive intent, the Court examined whether the statute
had punitive effects in light of seven factors); Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law": Community
Notification and the Constitution, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 129 (1995) (describing the Kennedy two-pronged test for determining if a statute was sufficiently punitive
to trigger constitutional protections).
47. Ch. 418, § 1, 58 Stat. 746 (1944) (repealed 1952).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1952) (repealed 1976).
49. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 147-52.
50. See id. at 148, 151-52. In Kennedy, the Court consolidated two district court cases
for review. See id. at 149, 152. Mendoza-Martinez, the appellee in the first case, moved to
Mexico in 1942 in order to avoid military service during the war. See id. at 147. Upon his
return to the United States after the war, Mendoza-Martinez was convicted of draft evasion in violation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and sentenced to a year
and a day in jail. See id. Five years after his release from prison, however, the government
attempted to deport Mendoza-Martinez, claiming that by fleeing the United States during
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Court found both statutory provisions unconstitutional because the laws
permitted the government to inflict criminal punishment on the petitioners without affording them constitutional safeguards. 1
In concluding that the challenged statutes were penal rather than
regulatory in nature, the Court employed a newly-created two-pronged
test. 2 Under the first prong, the Court examined whether Congress
manifested a clear intent that the sanctions should operate as criminal
penalties. 3 Within this prong, the Court examined both the legislative
history of the statutes at issue and the legislative history of predecessor
statutes. 4 In the case before it, the Court found that Congress clearly intended to punish draft-dodgers.5

wartime, he had lost citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1940. See id. at 148. Cort,
the appellee in the second case, having refused to return from living abroad in the early
1950s in order to fulfill his military obligations, desired to reenter the United States in
1959. See id. at 149-51. The government, however, denied his request for a new United
States passport on the grounds that he had forfeited his citizenship under the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 by remaining outside the United States for the purpose of
evading military service. See id. 151-52.
51. See id. at 167 (holding that because the citizenship forfeiture laws were punitive in
nature, defendants were guaranteed the procedural protections of the Constitution).
52. See id. at 168-69 (describing that the Court would first look to Congress's intent in
enacting the statute and then, absent a clear finding of a punitive intent, the Court would
apply seven factors to determine whether, nonetheless, evidence of a punitive intent existed); see also Goodman, supra note 7, at 784-85 (noting that if the Court found that the
legislature intended to punish, the Court automatically would consider the law punitive
and disregard the second prong of the test).
53. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 (finding, under the first prong, a clear expression of
Congress's punitive intent).
54. See id. at 170-84 (comparing the 1865 congressional floor debates regarding the
constitutionality of a forfeiture of citizenship law to the 1944 congressional debates concerning the statutes at issue to determine whether Congress intended the sanctions to
function as punishment); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2093 (1997)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that statements made by supporters of the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act indicated that the purpose behind the law was to further punish sex
offenders); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that statements
made by New York State legislators concerning the passage of a sex offender registration
statute "vividly show[ed] the passion, anger, and desire to punish" sex offenders), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998). The
Kennedy Court determined that the Nationality Act of 1940 originated from a Civil War
era act that punished deserters and draft evaders by requiring relinquishment of their
American citizenship and expulsion from the United States. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 170.
Moreover, in researching the floor debates of 1865, the Court found that both Houses of
Congress agreed that divesting a draft evader of his right of citizenship constituted punishment. See id. at 173-74. The Court also reasoned that because Congress modeled the
present statutes after the 1865 act, further evidence of a legislative intent to punish existed.
See id. at 180.
55. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 184.
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The Kennedy Court stated, however, that in the face of an ambiguous
legislative intent to punish under the first prong, the second prong in the
punitive/preventive analysis must be considered.56 Under this second
prong, the Court outlined the following seven criteria as relevant to a determination of whether a law was penal or regulatory in character:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned...."

56. See id. at 169 (emphasizing the importance of the second prong when the application of the first prong has failed to reveal the punitive nature of a law); see also Artway v.
Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 677 (D.N.J. 1995) (noting that where the legislative purpose behind a statute is ambiguous, the Court must apply the Kennedy factors to
determine whether a law is actually punitive), affd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Ariz. 1992) (en
banc) (stating that "[i]f the legislative aim was punitive, we treat the registration requirement as a punishment"); Goodman, supra note 7, at 785 (commenting that a finding of
regulatory intent on the part of the legislature would require a further analysis by the
court of the law's punitive "purpose or effect"). Courts and commentators have been extremely critical of the effectiveness of the seven-factors test in the punitive/preventive inquiry. See, e.g., Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d 367, 399-400 (N.J. 1995) (noting that later cases
have rejected the use of the "so-called" Kennedy test); Cheh, supra note 5, at 1358
(doubting whether courts will ever regard the Kennedy factors as important in the punitive/preventive analysis because the factors have never rendered a law punitive "for all
constitutional purposes"); Prevention Versus Punishment, supra note 3, at 1725-26 (advocating the abandonment of the Kennedy factors and urging the adoption of a test that assesses the deterrent or retributive impact of sex offender statutes on individuals).
57. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (internal footnotes omitted). The seven criteria outlined by the Court are rooted in the Court's own punitive/preventive jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (holding that a federal act providing for
the termination of social security benefits for deported aliens did not impose an "affirmative disability or restraint"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1958) (considering whether
a certain statute would promote the traditional aims of criminal punishment-retribution
and deterrence); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956) (concluding
that a civil monetary sanction was not so excessive or unreasonable as to qualify as a
criminal penalty); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (considering
whether certain behavior subject to a statutory civil sanction also could be considered
criminal); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (recognizing that a civil tax sanction resembled punishment more so than a civil tax remedy); Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922) (determining that the government's imposition of a civil tax penalty
required a finding of scienter); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896)
(noting that imprisonment and hard labor historically had been regarded as punishment).
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Although the Kennedy Court found it unnecessary to engage in a detailed analysis of these factors, the Court stated that such an examination
would lead to the conclusion that the statutes at issue were in fact punitive. 8
The Court's two-pronged test operated as a check on Congress's power
to punish citizens under the guise of a "civil" non-punitive law." By scrutinizing the legislature's intent under the first prong and measuring the
statute against the seven factors for further evidence of a punitive aim
under the second prong, the Court formulated a punitive/preventive
analysis that limited Congress's ability to regulate its citizens under its
police powers.6

B. Deferring to the Legislatureon the PunitivePreventiveQuestion
Under United States v. Ward
Subsequent decisions by the Court limited the impact of the Kennedy
decision by shifting the emphasis under both the first and second prongs
of the punitive/preventive test. 61 Years after Kennedy, the Court chose to
reformulate the two-pronged test, thereby signaling its unwillingness to
scrutinize a legislature's actual intent in establishing a putatively civil
statute.62

58. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169; see also Porter, supra note 2, at 551 (noting that the
Kennedy Court did not rely on the seven factors because in analyzing the legislative history of the law the Court found that Congress clearly intended the sanction to operate as a
punishment).
59. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the less deferential nature of the Kennedy two-pronged punitive/preventive test as compared with later versions
of the test).
60. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (comparing the Kennedy Court's
formulation of the two-pronged test with the Ward Court's version of the test); see also
Porter, supra note 2, at 552 (arguing that the Kennedy Court took a less deferential stance
than the Ward Court concerning a state's authority to punish its citizens through the civil
law).
61. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (limiting the first prong to
a "statutory construction" test, and arguing that the second prong must establish the
"clearest proof" that a law was punitive before the Court could declare it unconstitutional); see also Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 491, 493 (1997) (applying the
two-pronged test developed in Ward to determine whether a civil monetary penalty imposed on a defendant constituted punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363-65 (1984)
(employing the Ward two-pronged test in analyzing the punitive nature of a civil forfeiture
sanction); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 400 (N.J. 1995) (describing the Ward Court's transformation of the second prong of the punitive/preventive test).
62. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing the new two-pronged test
established in Ward); see also Allen, supra note 8, at 250-51 (discussing the "two-step" test
developed in Ward).
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United States v. Ward63 involved the imposition of a civil penalty on an
oil and gas company for an oil spill that the company reported to the Environmental Protection Agency. 64 Pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA),65 the Coast Guard assessed a $500 fine against
the company.66 The company appealed, claiming that the Act's reporting
requirements violated the company's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination because of the punitive nature of the sanction.67 Contrary to the Kennedy Court's examination of congressional intent under
the first prong of its analysis,68 the Ward Court embarked on a cursory
statutory construction analysis to determine whether Congress either expressly or impliedly intended the statute to serve civil or criminal purposes.69 As proof of Congress's intent to establish a civil penalty under
the CWA, the Court first reviewed the language Congress used to describe the sanction in the Act ° The Court determined that the use of the
word "civil" to describe the sanction and the separation of civil and
criminal penalties within the statute evidenced an unambiguous intent to
create a non-punitive civil penalty. 1 Unlike the Kennedy Court's analy-

63.

448 U.S. 242 (1980).

64. See id. at 246.
65. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water
Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3), (5)-(6) (1994) (prohibiting the discharge of oil into navigable
waters and providing that failure to report such a spill subjects the responsible individual
to a fine or imprisonment).
66. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 246-47.
67. See id. at 247.
68. See Porter, supra note 2, at 551 (describing the Kennedy Court's review of the
statute's legislative history to determine whether the law embodied a punitive intent).
69. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248; see also Cheh, supra note 5, at 1353-54 (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of the legislative label approach). But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2091 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that merely because the Kansas legislature labeled a statute as civil does not prove that the law is, in
practice, non-punitive); Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.
767, 793 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Constitution constrains the
States' ability to denominate proceedings as 'civil' and so dispense with the criminal procedure protections embodied in the Bill of Rights"). One of the major disadvantages to
the legislative label approach is that it may lead to legislative abuse. See Cheh, supra note
5, at 1353-54. For example, a legislature might label a clearly criminal sanction as "civil"
in order to bypass constitutional protections guaranteed to criminal defendants. See id.
Moreover, when addressing civil statutes that involve incapacitation, at least one commentator has warned against using the legislative label approach. See French, supra note 4, at
223 (arguing that it is short-sighted of courts to rely solely on the face of a statute when
categorizing the statute as civil or criminal because incapacitation involves both punitive
and preventive elements).
70. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
71. See id. (stressing that the "civil" label demonstrated Congress's non-punitive intent especially since criminal penalties were set out in the preceding paragraph); see also
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sis of congressional intent," the Ward Court simply deferred to the manner in which Congress labeled the statute as evidence that Congress intended a civil, rather than criminal, sanction.73
Although the Court found that Congress's express use of the word
"civil" in the statute satisfied the first prong of the inquiry, the Ward
Court chose to proceed and apply the second prong of the Kennedy
analysis. 74 The Ward Court stated, however, that while the Kennedy factors aided in the punitive/preventive inquiry, the Court was not bound to
consider all of the factors.75 Moreover, the Court placed a heavy burden
on the moving party to establish, by the "clearest proof," that the punitive purpose or effect of the statute eviscerated Congress's non-punitive
intention.76 Ultimately,
the Court found that the plaintiff failed to pro77
proof.
such
vide
Although adhering to the general framework of the punitive/preventive analysis established by Kennedy, the Ward Court limited
both prongs of the test.78 Ward suggested that Congress's intent repreHendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (finding that Kansas meant to create a civil commitment
scheme based on the placement of the Act in the probate code rather than the criminal
code, and the legislature's description of the Act as civil); Porter, supra note 2, at 550 (interpreting Ward as suggesting that courts can infer legislative intent when an unlabeled
sanction is positioned next to a sanction labeled "criminal").
72. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing the Kennedy Court's exhaustive review of a statute's legislative history to decipher whether the legislature evidenced a punitive intent).
73. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-51; see also United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency,
33 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the punitive/preventive test under Ward
"focused heavily on the label Congress had attached to a particular sanction"), rev'd, 116
S. Ct. 2135 (1996); supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Ward Court's
use of the legislative label approach on the issue of congressional intent).
74. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
75. See id. (declining to apply all but the fifth Kennedy factor to determine whether a
monetary civil penalty constituted punishment); see also Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 40001 (N.J. 1995) (noting that Ward weakened the importance of the Kennedy factors in the
punitive/preventive analysis).
76. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 251.
77. See id. As to the fifth Kennedy factor, "whether the behavior to which [the penalty] applies is already a crime," the respondent argued that an earlier federal law already
made his conduct a crime. See id. at 249-50 (alteration in original). The Court, however,
disregarded this argument reasoning that Congress could inflict both a criminal and civil
penalty for the same act. See id. at 250.
78. Compare id. at 249-51 (focusing on legislative labels under the intent prong and
applying only one of the seven factors under the second prong), with Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167-69 (1963) (examining legislative history under the intent
prong and stressing application of the seven factors under the second prong). The Court
reaffirmed the application of the Ward test in United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,
2147-48 (1996). In Ursery, the Court reviewed two civil forfeiture proceedings to determine whether they constituted criminal punishment or merely civil sanctions. See id. at
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sented the most significant factor in determining whether legislation was
more punitive than regulatory in nature. 9 In characterizing Congress's
intent, the Ward Court deferred to the label that Congress had assigned
to the statute. 8° Additionally, the Court narrowed the viability of the
seven-factors test by requiring that such factors elicit the "clearest proof"
81
of a statute's punitive aim.
The two-pronged test which emerged in Ward conveyed the Court's
reluctance to override Congress's prerogative to regulate citizens under
its police power. 82 The Court greatly reduced the likelihood that the application of the two-pronged test would result in a determination that a
statute was more punitive than regulatory.83 In so doing, the Court applied a punitive/preventive analysis that substantially deferred to the
legislature's own characterization of a statute as civil and non-punitive. 81
Under this reformulated test, the Court considered a "civil" label attached to a law as prima facie evidence of the statute's non-punitive nature.85 In adopting this more deferential test, the Court effectively
broadened
legislative authority to regulate individuals under its police
86
powers.
2138. In finding that the statutes were non-punitive in nature, the Court applied the modified two-pronged test from Ward. See id. at 2147-48; see also Hudson v. United States, 118
S. Ct. 488, 491 (1997) (applying the Ward test to determine whether the imposition of certain civil monetary penalties constituted punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
79. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. But see Prevention Versus Punishment,supra note 3, at
1720 (stating that one of the difficulties with the legislative intent approach is that this approach often fails to reveal the true motivations of the legislature in enacting a given statute).
80. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249. But see Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2163 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing reliance by courts on legislative labels when determining double jeopardy issues).
81. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
82. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the deferential nature of
the Ward two-pronged test).
83. Cf. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (deferring to Congress's stated intent to create a civil
sanction under the first prong and referring to the Kennedy criteria under the second
prong as "helpful" but "neither exhaustive nor dispositive"); see also Porter, supra note 2,
at 552 (stating that "the Supreme Court has never invalidated a sanction based on these
factors").
84. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49; see also Porter, supra note 2, at 552 (describing the
Ward test as more deferential that the Kennedy test because the Ward Court did not question whether Congress intended to punish but only whether Congress chose a "civil" or
"criminal" label).
85. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49; see also supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing the dominance of legislative labels in the punitive/preventive analysis under
Ward).
86. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (drawing distinctions between the
Kennedy and Ward tests to demonstrate the latter's deferential nature).
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C. The Role of Treatment in the Punitive/PreventiveTest as Applied to
Involuntary Civil Commitment Statutes
Following the decision in Ward, the Court developed a less deferential
test to apply in cases challenging civil involuntary commitment statutes.Y
Although retaining both prongs of the Kennedy and Ward tests, the
Court no longer considered civil labels as the strongest evidence of a
legislature's non-punitive intent." Looking beyond civil labels, the Court
focused instead on a statute's goal of providing treatment and care to institutionalized individuals as key evidence of a legislature's non-punitive
intent. 89
Allen v. Illinois9° centered around the application of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act to a defendant charged with committing sex
offenses. 9 Pursuant to the Act, the State of Illinois initiated civil proceedings against the defendant to have him committed to a psychiatric
institution as a sexually dangerous person.9 The Act required the defendant to submit to two psychiatric evaluations administered by the state,
after which the examining psychiatrists testified at the sexually dangerous person proceedings.9 Arguing that the sexually dangerous person
87. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986) (stating that "civil label[s] [are]
not always dispositive" when determining whether a law is punitive for self-incrimination
purposes); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (asserting that civil designations would not prevail where such a fundamental liberty interest as an individual's interest in being free from bodily restraint is at stake); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66
(1970) (stressing that for the purpose of resolving whether juvenile proceedings required
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof, the Court would not allow the state's
"civil labels and good intentions [to] ... obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts").
88. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 368-70 (analyzing the punitive nature of the Act in light of
the Ward two-pronged test); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's reluctance to rely on legislative labels to determine a civil commitment law's punitive nature).
89. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 369-70 (finding that Illinois sought to provide treatmentan essentially non-punitive aim-to individuals committed under the Act); see also Richards, supra note 3, at 374 (noting that the treatment aspect of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act led the Allen Court to conclude that the law was non-punitive); Brief
for Respondent and Cross Petitioner- at 17, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997)
(No. 95-1649) (noting that, unlike the Kansas Act, the Illinois Act provided for treatment
in lieu of punishment).
90. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
91. See id. at 365. The State charged the defendant with the crimes of unlawful restraint and deviant sexual assault. See id.
92. See id. at 365-66. The State initially had charged the defendant criminally, but the
trial court dismissed those charges for lack of probable cause. See id. Following the dismissal of the criminal charges, the State petitioned to have the defendant declared a sexually dangerous person under the Act. See id.
93. See id. at 366. After interviewing the defendant, the psychiatrists testified that the
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proceedings were criminal rather than civil in nature, the defendant
claimed that the requirement that he be evaluated by the psychiatrists
violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 9
In finding the Act essentially civil in nature, the Supreme Court applied a less deferential version of the two-pronged test.9 Regarding the
first prong, the Court noted that Illinois expressly had enacted a civil
statute. 96 The Court, however, asserted that a "civil label [was] not always dispositive" on the issue of legislative intent. 97 Rather, the Court
regarded the legislature's concern for treatment as convincing evidence
of non-punitive intent.9' The Court stated that the law at issue placed a
"statutory obligation" on the State of Illinois to provide treatment for
individuals committed under its statute. 99 Moreover, the Court noted
that, although commitment occurred in an institution under the authority
of the State Corrections Department, the defendant's confinement conditions were not inconsistent with the state's goal of treatment. 1°° Further,
the Court noted that the state "disavowed any interest in punishment" by
allowing for release as soon as the individual was no longer mentally ill.10'

defendant was "mentally ill and had criminal propensities to commit sexual assaults." Id.
As a result of the testimony of the psychiatrists and the testimony of the defendant's victim, the trial court found that confinement under the Act was warranted. See id.
94. See id. at 368.
95. See id. at 368-69 (applying the Ward two-pronged test but specifically noting that
the Court would look beyond the civil label); supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text
(rejecting the idea that a "civil label" alone indicated a legislature's non-punitive intent in
enacting a civil involuntary commitment statute).
96. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 368 (noting that the legislature stated that the proceedings
under the Act should be "civil in nature").
97. See id. at 369.
98. See id. at 369-70; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (1997) (noting that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, like the Act in Allen, imposed a "statutory obligation" on the state to provide care and treatment); State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d
563, 566 (Tex. 1977) (stating that civil confinement of mental patients in Texas may be imposed only for the purposes of care and treatment); supra note 89 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's focus on treatment in the punitive/preventive analysis).
99. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 369.
100. See id. at 373; see also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 (1966) (stating that
although a state's corrections department is free to commit dangerously insane persons,
classifications of these individuals cannot be "wholly arbitrary"); Brief for Respondent
and Cross Petitioner at 18, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649)
(noting that the statute at issue in Allen allowed for treatment to be administered in a variety of facilities and not simply in a secure facility); Francis, supra note 11, at 150-51
(commenting that Minnesota's civil sex offender commitment statute is non-punitive under Allen because the confinement conditions are distinct from the criminal confinement
conditions and consistent with the statute's goal of treatment).
101. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 370.
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Under the second prong, the Court looked to one Kennedy factor to
scrutinize whether the statute was truly non-punitive. 12 The Court found
that the statute did not promote retribution and deterrence, the traditional aims of punishment, because the law provided for care and treatment of confined individuals.0 3 The Court also held that the use of evidence of prior criminal conduct in the sexually dangerous person
proceeding served only to determine the mental condition and
dangerousness of the individual, and not to punish past crimes in and of
themselves19
In finding the Illinois act civil rather than criminal in nature, the Court
concluded that individuals committed under the statute could not avail
themselves of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination. The Allen Court determined that legislative labels were
not controlling in the punitive/preventive analysis.' ° The Court rather
adopted a legislative goal of treatment as the benchmark for determining
whether an involuntary civil commitment statute was "so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention."' 7 Although the
Court retained the basic two-pronged structure, the Court tailored the
test in the context of civil confinement laws.1 O By requiring such laws to
contain meaningful treatment provisions in order to pass constitutional
standards, the Court advanced a more conservative approach to a state's
right to regulate dangerous individuals through civil confinement.'°9

102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 371.
105. See id. at 375.
106. See id. at 369.
107. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2092 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Allen Court
regarded treatment as a "touchstone" in the punitive/preventive analysis).
108. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 369-70 (finding the Act non-punitive because Illinois had
provided treatment to those committed under the Act); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117
S. Ct. 2072, 2098 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning that where an individual's liberty
interest is at stake, legislatures cannot cut constitutional corners but must "tailor the statute to fit the nonpunitive civil aim of treatment"); supra note 95 and accompanying text
(discussing the less deferential two-pronged test in the context of civil commitment laws).
109. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (comparing the Ward test to the Allen
test and concluding that the Allen test is less deferential); see also Blacher, supra note 5, at
913 (stating that "[p]reventive detention without treatment is asserted then to be punitive
and thus the invasion of the offender's liberty interest is not justified by the state's parens
patriaepower").
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II. KANSAS V. HENDRICKS: APPLYING THE DEFERENTIAL WARD TEST
TO THE PUNITIVE/PREVENTIVE ANALYSIS OF INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT STATUTES

In Kansas v. Hendricks,"' the Supreme Court applied the Ward Court's
deferential two-pronged test to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act in order to determine whether the Act was punitive in nature and
thus violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the
Constitution."' The Court also found that the statute's treatment provisions constituted additional, yet persuasive, evidence that the legislature
intended the statute to be non-punitive.'
In 1984, the state district court sentenced Hendricks to five to twenty
years in prison for taking indecent liberties with two teenage boys."3 Just
prior to Hendricks's parole date, the State of Kansas petitioned to have
him involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator pursuant to
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. 4 A jury unanimously found
Hendricks to be a sexually violent predator within the meaning of the
Act, and the district court committed Hendricks to the custody of the
State Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services."'
Hendricks appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas arguing that the
Act violated the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto
Clauses of the Constitution."' The court found the Act invalid on substantive due process grounds,"' and the State of Kansas appealed to the
United States Supreme Court."8 Hendricks filed a cross-petition on appeal reasserting his double jeopardy and ex post facto claims." 9 The Su110. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
111. See id. at 2081 (explaining that categorization of a proceeding as civil or criminal
is a question of statutory construction).
112. See id. at 2084. The Court stated, however, that providing treatment to individuals confined under the Act need not be the "primary" purpose of the law in order to characterize it as non-punitive. See id.
113. See id. at 2078; In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2072 (1997); see also Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 10 (chronicling Hendricks's criminal history and noting that he had admitted to forcing his own stepchildren to perform oral sex
on him). Hendricks's own mother abused him as a child by making him wear girls' clothing
and underwear. See Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 10.
114. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
115. See id. at 2078-79 (finding persuasive Hendricks's admission that he would molest
again if released from prison in determining his status as a sexually violent predator within
the meaning of the Act); see also supra notes 27-28 (describing the relevant provisions of
the Act as applied to Hendricks).
116. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
117. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
118. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).
119. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
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preme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Act violated
20
Hendricks's rights under all three constitutional challenges.
A. The Majority Opinion:Reaffirming the Two-Pronged Test and
Redefining the Role of Treatment in the Punitive/PreventiveAnalysis
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act did not violate the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, or
Ex Post Facto Clauses.1 In characterizing the Act as non-punitive in nature, the majority applied the deferential two-pronged Ward test.'2 In so
doing, the majority rejected the concept that care and treatment must be
the primary aim of a civil commitment statute in order to classify the law
as non-punitive for constitutional purposes.121
1. Reaffirming the Ward Two-Pronged Test
The Hendricks majority began its inquiry into whether the Act established criminal or civil proceedings by first reviewing the Kansas legislature's intent.124 In ascertaining whether the legislature intended the statute to establish civil non-punitive proceedings, the majority applied the
first prong of the punitive/preventive analysis formulated in Ward. 25 As
in Ward, the majority deferred to the legislature's choice of a civil label
as evidence of the legislature's "manifest intent" to provide a civil rather
than criminal penalty.12 6 The majority further relied on other factors,
such as the legislature's placement of the Act in the probate code as opposed to the criminal code, as additional evidence of the statute's nonpunitive purpose.
By applying the deferential intent prong of Ward,
120. See id. at 2076.
121. See id. at 2086.
122. See id. at 2081-82 (looking at civil labels under the first prong as evidence of the
legislature's non-punitive intent and stating that under the second prong only "'the clearest proof' that 'the statutory scheme [was] so punitive either in purpose or effect"' would
override the legislature's non-punitive intent) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 248-49 (1980); see also Porter, supra note 2, at 552 (describing the deferential nature
of the Ward test).
123. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (finding that an ancillary purpose of treatment
would suffice to render a statute non-punitive).
124. See id. at 2081-82 (stating that "[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests that
the legislature sought to" enact a punitive commitment scheme).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 2082; see also Goodman, supra note 7, at 785 & n.133 (noting that when
legislative intent was ambiguous, the Court would accept a "civil" label as establishing a
non-punitive intent).
127. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082; see also Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (relying on the
juxtaposition of a plainly labeled "civil" penalty with a penalty labeled "criminal" as additional evidence of the non-punitive nature of the law); supra note 71 (discussing the non-
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the majority acknowledged Kansas's authority to regulate and protect its
118
citizens under its general police powers.
Even though the majority found that the legislature intended to create
a non-punitive commitment scheme, the Court still applied the second
prong, recognizing that "a civil label is not always dispositive.' ' 2 9 The
majority stated that it would ignore the legislature's non-punitive intent,
signified by a civil label, only in cases where the defendant presented
evidence of a contrary legislative intent or purpose to puncompelling
130
ish.

In applying the second prong of the deferential Ward punitive/preventive analysis, the majority looked to the seven factors listed in
the Kennedy decision.13 ' The Hendricks Court determined that commitment proceedings under the Act did not involve either retribution or deterrence-the two principal aims of criminal punishment. 32 Moreover,
the Court found that commitment under the Act did not depend on an
individual's criminal intent.'33 Although the majority recognized that the
law involved an affirmative restraint on an individuals liberty, the majority noted that this fact alone did not render the statute punitive.34 The
Court also stated that involuntary 135civil commitment laws historically
have been regarded as non-punitive.
punitive inference that arises when a civil statute is placed next to a criminal statute).
128. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083 (stating that involuntary confinement to protect
the community from dangerous individuals is a legitimate exercise of a state's police
power); see also Richards, supra note 3, at 338 (noting that the Court has acknowledged
that detention for the purpose of protecting the public is not punishment per se).
129. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2082 (internal quotations omitted).
130. See id.
131. Cf.id. Although the Court does not refer to these criteria as deriving from Kennedy, reference to Kennedy establishes the origin of these factors. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (outlining the seven factors traditionally used
to determine the punitive nature of a law where the legislative intent is ambiguous).
132. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2082 (finding that "[t]he Act's purpose is not retributive because it does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct"). The Court also
found that the Act did not function as a deterrent because persons suffering from a mental
disorders are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement. See id.; see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168 (stating that a law may be considered punitive if it promotes retribution and deterrence).
133. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2082 (finding that the Act did not require scienter);
see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168 (noting that a scienter requirement in the sanction evidences a punitive intent).
134. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2082; see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168 (requiring an
analysis of whether a law involves an affirmative disability or restraint in determining a
law's punitive nature).
135. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2083 (noting that "the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment") (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
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In finding the Act civil rather than criminal, the majority reaffirmed
the validity of the Ward two-pronged test in the punitive/preventive inquiry.136 In addition, this application of the deferential Ward test signified the Court's desire to allow states freely to formulate methods by
which to address the growing threat that released sex offenders pose to
society.137
2. Redefining the Role of Treatment
Despite the Court's earlier reasoning that a civil commitment statute's
lack of comprehensive treatment provisions could render a law punitive,"' the Hendricks majority de-emphasized treatment as a critical part
of the punitive/preventive analysis. 9 The majority concluded that despite the Kansas Supreme Court's recognition of the Act's treatment
provisions as "somewhat disingenuous," this finding did not offer the
"clearest proof" that the legislature intended to create a punitive sanction.141
The Hendricks Court noted that the incapacitation of dangerously insane individuals constituted a sufficiently legitimate non-punitive goal to
sustain the statute's "civil" label, despite the fact that treatment remained merely "ancillary" to the overall purposes of the statute' 4 The
Court further asserted that even if adequate treatment did exist for Hendricks, and the State simply chose not to provide it to him, the Court
136. See id. (applying the two-pronged test of Ward to determine the Act's punitive
nature).
137. Cf. id. at 2082 (suggesting that the Ward two-pronged test rarely rendered an ostensibly civil statute as actually criminal); see also Teir & Coy, supra note 4, at 413 (noting
that community notification and registration statutes do not offer as much protection to
society against the dangers of sexual predators as do civil commitment laws); supra note 4
and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory powers of the states and the federal
government to protect the health and welfare of society).
138. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986) (finding the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act non-punitive, in part, because of its goal of providing treatment); see
also McAllister, supra note 5, at 455 (stating that the Allen Court relied on the legislature's
concern for care and treatment to conclude that the law was non-punitive); Francis, supra
note 11, at 131 (interpreting the Allen Court's decision as requiring civil commitment laws
to contain treatment provisions in order to find them non-punitive).
139. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (noting that a statutory obligation for the state
to provide care and treatment sufficed to render the Act non-punitive); see also Butler,
supra note 33, at S49 (arguing that the Hendricks Court "lessened the importance of
treatment" in determining whether civil confinement is punitive or non-punitive).
140. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084; see also In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan.
1996) (noting that the goal of the Act was to continue incarceration), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2072
(1997).
141. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (stating that treatment did not have to be the
state's overriding concern).
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would remain reluctant to classify the Act as punitive. 42 In affording extreme deference to the Kansas legislature, the majority reasoned that
since the language of the Act imposed an obligation on the State to provide Hendricks with treatment, the Court would not question whether he
143
actually received any.
In rejecting an earlier focus upon treatment as an important indicator
of a civil commitment law's non-punitive nature, the Court scaled back
the role that treatment previously had occupied in the punitive/preventive analysis. 144 In particular, the Court indicated that where a
142. See id. (interpreting the Kansas Supreme Court decision as implying that although Hendricks suffered from a treatable condition, the State did not treat him during
his confinement); see also id. at 2096 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the State decided
that Hendricks was amenable to treatment, but refused to provide it to him). Although
the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to treatment for mentally ill persons
involuntarily confined to institutions, courts have interpreted the Constitution to grant
such a right. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (implying that
the Constitution guarantees a right to treatment for mentally ill individuals who are involuntarily committed); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding
that institutionalized mental patients have a constitutional right to receive treatment);
ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES 205 (1996) (addressing whether a constitutional right to treatment exists for
individuals with mental disabilities). Furthermore, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
institutionalized mental patients have a right to minimally adequate treatment. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982). Although the Constitution requires
treatment as a precondition for civil confinement in cases where an individual suffers from
a treatable mental illness, debate exists as to whether a state could constitutionally confine
a mentally ill and dangerous individual for whom no treatment existed. See Hendricks,
117 S. Ct. at 2084, 2090; O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583-84 (1975) (Burger, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that the Constitution may not prevent a state from confining
a mentally ill individual unamenable to treatment). Both the majority and dissent in Hendricks reasoned that if the psychiatric community had not yet developed effective treatment methods for pedophilia, Hendricks's confinement could remain constitutional. See
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084, 2090. The Justices, however, noted that Kansas conceded
that the state could provide Hendricks with treatment. See id.; see also The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 259, 262-63 (1997) (discussing the
majority's interpretation of Kansas's ability to commit Hendricks absent a treatable mental illness).
143. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084-85 (commenting that because treatment provisions were written into the statute, the Court would assume that treatment was being provided).
144. Compare id. at 2084 (requiring only the possibility that treatment constitute an
ancillary aim of a civil involuntary commitment law in order for the Court to view the law
as non-punitive), with Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1986) (finding a civil involuntary commitment law non-punitive based on the law's primary purpose of providing
treatment to committed individuals); see also Butler, supra note 33, at S49 (commenting
that the Hendricks Court de-emphasized the role of treatment as a condition of civil commitment); John W. Parry, Executive Summary and Analysis, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 435, 436 (1997) (stating that following the Hendricks decision, the

role of treatment in the civil commitment context "will be subject to new interpretations").
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statutory promise to provide care and treatment existed, the actual structure of the treatment program, if any, played no part in the punitive/preventive analysis. 141 Under this analysis, the majority evinced a
sensitivity to a state's need to protect its citizens from future harm at the
hands of sexual predators. 146
B. The Concurrence:Revisiting the Role of Treatment
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, focused on whether the Act
was punitive by analyzing the legislature's goal in creating the treatment
provisions. 47 Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that Kansas's intention to provide treatment for individuals committed under the Act
was sufficient to render the law non-punitive.'9 Justice Kennedy
stressed, however, that if the Kansas legislature had created the treatment provisions as a "mere pretext" for continued punishment, the law
would have violated the ex post facto prohibition. 9 Justice Kennedy
cautioned that, in the absence of a true goal to afford treatment, "the
practical effect of the Kansas law may be to impose confinement for
life. '"' In light of the reality that pedophilia treatment schemes were not
very advanced, Justice Kennedy expressed concern as to the wisdom of

But see McAllister, supra note 5, at 455 (predicting that the Hendricks Court would find
the Kansas Act constitutional because of the Act's focus on care and treatment of sexual
predators).
145. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084-85 & nn.4 & 5 (acknowledging that although
treatment remained essentially lacking for Hendricks for close to a year after his commitment, Kansas had broad discretion in formulating the treatment regimen).
146. See supra notes 19 & 124-37 and accompailying text (discussing the Ward Court's
deferential two-pronged punitive/preventive analysis and the Hendricks Court's application of that test); cf Green, supra note 5, at 1542 n.10 (stating that after the Supreme
Court's holdings in Hendricks and Ursery, "it is now harder than ever to distinguish the
'criminal' from the 'civil"').
147. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the Act
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the care and treatment provisions under
the Act were a legitimate goal of the State and not "a sham or mere pretext"). But see
Brief for Respondent and Cross Petitioner at 21-22, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072
(1997) (No. 95-1649) (calling the Act "a thinly-veiled attempt to seek an additional term of
incarceration against a defendant it believes it may have treated too leniently more than a
decade ago").
148. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. See id.
150. Id. (noting the importance of an effective treatment scheme to a non-punitive determination); see also James R. Covington, III, Preventive Detention for Sex Offenders, 85
ILL. B.J. 493, 501 (1997) (interpreting Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Hendricks to require that states offer legitimate medical treatment to sexually violent predators in order
for the offenders' confinement to remain non-punitive).
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allowing the civil system rather than the criminal system to confine an
individual for life. 1
Although he recognized a state's police power authority to confine
mentally ill and dangerous individuals, Justice Kennedy nonetheless
warned of the potential threats to individual rights when the civil and
criminal systems are combined to effect the common goal of incapacitation. 52 Justice Kennedy noted that once the civil system is used to exact
retribution and deterrence, goals reserved for the criminal justice system,
Justice Kennedy asserted
the law has crossed the constitutional line.'
that where involuntary civil commitment statutes lack effective treatment
exists."1
provisions, "an indication of the forbidden purpose to punish"
Thus, Justice Kennedy followed the principle that treatment was a
benchmark in distinguishing punitive from preventive state involuntary
commitment laws.'
C. The Dissent: Elevatingthe Role of Treatment in the
Punitive/PreventiveAnalysis
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented with respect to the majority's interpretation of the Act's nonpunitive nature in light of the Ex Post Facto Clause.156 The dissent, following the Court's focus on treatment in earlier cases, concluded that
treatment must be a civil commitment law's overriding goal in order to
characterize the law as non-punitive for constitutional purposes.'57
In searching beyond the Act's civil label and examining the legislature's concern for treatment, the dissent found that treatment was not a
primary goal of the statute. The dissent agreed with the state court's
151. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152. See id.
153. See id. (cautioning that, "while incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for
the criminal system alone").
154. Id.
155. See id.; see also Francis, supra note 11, at 156 (noting that laws providing for the
civil confinement of sexual predators escape a punitive categorization because of their
goal to treat the offenders).
156. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (applying the Ward
two-pronged test initially, but resting its analysis primarily on the legislature's concern for
treatment).
157. See id. at 2092-93 (stressing that the Act was punitive because the State had not
provided for any treatment at the time of Hendricks's commitment); see also Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (stating that "[tihe purpose of involuntary
hospitalization is treatment, not punishment").
158. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2091-93; Thomas J. Foltz, Review of High Court
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categorization of the treatment provisions of the Act as "somewhat disingenuous."'5 9 The dissent relied on both the trial court record and the
legislative debate surrounding the law's enactment, concluding that the
legislature's main purpose was the continued incarceration of sexually
violent predators. 6 The dissent regarded statements made
by sponsors
61
of the Act particularly persuasive to a punitive finding.'
The dissent also noted that although Kansas had committed Hendricks
under the Act, no treatment was forthcoming. 162 Justice Breyer concluded that Kansas's failure to treat Hendricks combined with the Act's
lack of a treatment scheme, evinced the legislature's punitive intent.' 63
Additionally, because the legislature deferred both diagnosis and treatment of Hendricks until only weeks prior to his release, the dissent found
this indicative of the Act's intent to punish.'6 The dissent noted that this
delay in treatment was incompatible with the legislature's own acknowledgment that sexual predators required long-term treatment.9' Finally,
the Hendricks dissent compared the Act's treatment provision with the
treatment provisions embodied in other states' sex offender statutes and

Cases, 12 CRIM. JUST. 34, 36 (1997) (noting that the Hendricks dissent followed the Allen
Court's focus on treatment in finding the Kansas Act punitive in nature).
159. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. See id. (describing the views of those who supported the Act); see also Brief for
Respondent and Cross Petitioner at 5-8, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997) (No.
95-1649) (arguing that statements from the sponsors of the Kansas legislation strongly
evinced the legislature's punitive intent). Kansas State Attorney General Carla Stovall
stated, "We cannot open our prison doors and let these animals back into our communities." Brief for Respondent and Cross Petitioner at 6, Hendricks (No. 95-1649). Stovall
further asserted that the law "would allow us to keep the sexually violent offenders locked
up indefinitely." Id.; see also Prevention Versus Punishment,supra note 3, at 1727 (arguing
that in determining whether a sex offender commitment law is punitive, courts must decide "whether [the law's] primary effect is treatment of the affected individual, or satisfaction of the societal interest in locking sex offenders up and throwing away the key").
161. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued
that supporters of the legislation hoped that the Act would have the effect of confining
sexually violent predators for life. See id.; see also Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that an examination of legislative intent must extend beyond the
text of the preamble and into the legislative debates surrounding the enactment of the
state's sex offender registration law), affd in part, rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1066 (1998).
162. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the director
of the commitment program affirmed that Hendricks received no treatment).
163.

See id.

164. See id. at 2093-94 (arguing that an act intending only to confine logically would
not focus on beginning treatment sooner).
165. See id. at 2094.

1998]

Kansas v. Hendricks

found that those statutes offered treatment soon after the individual's arrest.' 6
Although the dissent recognized that a state, pursuant to its police
powers, may commit those who are dangerous and mentally ill for treatment, the dissent asserted that Kansas, at the time it committed Hendricks, had no intention of providing any real treatment for him.167 The
dissent emphasized that where an individual's liberty interest is at stake,
a state cannot "cut comers," but must craft its law, in both purpose and
effect, to suit the non-punitive goal of treatment.'9 Although the Hendricks dissent essentially endorsed the use of the two-pronged test, the
dissent concluded that the majority's application of the test wrongfully
failed to examine beyond the civil label and that the absence of an effective treatment plan rendered the Act unconstitutional. 69
III. REFORMULATING THE PUNITIVE/PREVENTIVE DOCTRINE

Although the Court in Hendricks applied the two-pronged punitive/preventive analysis developed by Ward, the Court failed to apply
the test to involuntary civil commitment statutes in accordance with Allen. 7' The majority disregarded the Allen Court's emphasis on treatment
as the primary standard against which to measure a civil commitment
law's punitive nature.'72 As a result, the majority reformulated the puni166. See id. at 2095 (stating that the Kansas Act, when compared to the sexually violent predator laws of ten other states, appears punitive); see also Blacher, supra note 5, at
912 (noting that constitutional problems arise when a state seeks to confine a person after
criminally punishing him for the same offense).
167. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Kansas did
not have to postpone Hendricks's treatment until after he had served his prison sentence).
168. See id. at 2098.
169. See id.; see also Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1275 n.14 (2nd Cir. 1997) (noting
that Justice Breyer found the Kansas Act at issue in Hendricks punitive because of the
law's lack of an effective treatment scheme for the defendant), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066
(1998).
170. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (describing the majority's reliance on
the Ward punitive/preventive test).
171. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085 & n.5 (acknowledging that although Kansas did
not even offer Hendricks treatment at the time of his confinement, his confinement nonetheless remained non-punitive); see also Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Leroy Hendricks at 16, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072
(1997) (No. 95-1649) (arguing that the Kansas statute lacked a sincere interest in treating
Hendricks, unlike the Illinios law at issue in Allen where the very structure of the law
promoted treatment); supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (describing the Hendricks Court's disregard for treatment as a crucial indicator of a civil commitment law's
non-punitive aim).
172. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (commenting that treatment did not have to be
the state's overriding concern). The majority ignored the state court's finding that treat-
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tive/preventive analysis for civil commitment statutes. 173 As Justice
Breyer recognized in his dissent, the holding in Hendricks effectively
stripped away the Allen Court's focus on treatment in the punitive/preventive analysis. 174 Thus, the Hendricks majority essentially expanded a state's police power authority
to confine dangerous sex offend175
statutes.
commitment
civil
ers under
A. The Hendricks Court CorrectlyApplied the Ward Two-Pronged Test
The Hendricks Court appropriately employed the two-pronged test established by Ward. 76 By first considering legislative intent and then applying the Kennedy factors, the majority adhered to precedent setting
forth the general framework within which to test a law's punitive nature.171
As in Ward, the majority in Hendricks first examined whether the legislature intended to create a civil non-punitive sanction. 1 8 The majority
properly considered the Act's "civil" label as rebuttably presumptive
evidence that the legislature contemplated a non-punitive law.17 9 In acment was not the goal of the statute. See id.; see also supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's interpretation of the role of treatment in the punitive/preventive analysis in light of Allen).
173. See supra notes 138-45 (discussing the majority's application of the deferential
two-pronged test and its rejection of the Allen Court's reliance on treatment as an essential element of a truly non-punitive civil commitment law).
174. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2097 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that if the Court
followed the Allen Court's analysis, it would have determined that the law was punitive);
see also Butler, supra note 33, at S49 (asserting that the Hendricks Court de-emphasized
the significance of treatment as an important qualification for involuntary confinement).
175. See Brief for Leroy Hendricks Cross-Petitioner at 25, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.
Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (contending that the Kansas legislature had attempted to
expand its police powers by disguising the criminal nature of its law with a hollow promise
to provide treatment); see also Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Leroy Hendricks at 8, Hendricks (No. 95-1649) (stating that the Act
signifies an impermissible extension of the state's parens patriaepower); cf Richards, supra note 3, at 331 (commenting that the Supreme Court gradually had expanded a state's
authority to restrict the liberty of individuals under its police powers).
176. See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's application of the Ward two-pronged test); see also supra notes 14-19 (explaining how the Kennedy-Ward test has evolved into the primary method against which to judge a law's punitive nature).
177. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (describing the Ward two-pronged
test as the mode of analysis when confronted with punitive/preventive issues).
178. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (stating that the issue of whether a proceeding is punitive or preventive is a question of "statutory construction").
179. See id. at 2082; see also Porter, supra note 2, at 550-51 (describing the Ward
Court's position that a "civil" label established a rebuttable presumption that the legislature intended the law to be non-punitive).
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cord with an earlier decision, as well, the majority noted that "a civil label is not always dispositive" when analyzing the punitive nature of civil
commitment statutes. 18°
Under the second prong, the majority considered the seven factors first
delineated by the Kennedy Court and later adopted by the Court in
Ward.' These factors, however, rarely offered the clear proof required
to override a legislature's intention to create a civil law."" Therefore, the
majority argued that these factors, as applied to the Kansas statute, did
not render the Act punitive.1
The dissent disagreed with the majority, contending that the evidence
indicated that the Act constituted punishment. s' Unlike the Ward Court,
which stated that the seven factors were helpful but not binding in the
punitive/preventive analysis, the dissent considered the factors more determinative in such an analysis.' The dissent thus ignored firmly rooted
precedent signaling the non-binding nature of the Kennedy factors when
it stated that the factors actually added up to a punitive determination.""
Although historically the Kennedy factors had failed to yield punitive
findings, the dissent gave the factors greater weight than the Court had in
previous decisions.' 7
180. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (internal quotations omitted); see also Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (stating that a civil label is not always controlling on the
issue of legislative intent).
181. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (stating that the Kansas law neither required a
finding of scienter nor functioned as a deterrent to future criminal conduct); see also supra
notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of the Kennedy factors in
its analysis). But see Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2097 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stressing that if
the Act were tested against the factors set forth in Kennedy, a punitive determination
would result).
182. Cf. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (analyzing the Act in light of the Kennedy factors but noting that that they failed to meet the heavy burden of establishing by the
"clearest proof" the punitive nature of the Act); see also supra note 56 and accompanying
text (criticizing the Kennedy factors for producing inconsistent results).
183. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (applying the third and fourth Kennedy factors);
supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text (describing the Hendricks majority's application of the Kennedy criteria).
184. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Act was
punitive in light of the seven factors test).
185. See id.
186. See id.; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (stating that
once the legislature has indicated a non-punitive intent, such intent only will be set aside
upon a showing of the "clearest proof" of a law's punitive nature); Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (commenting that the seven factors are "all relevant
to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions").
187. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Kennedy factors are "neither exhaustive nor dispositive," but nonetheless stating that an application of the factors to the Kansas Act favored a punitive finding) (quoting Ward, 448
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The majority, by issuing a non-punitive finding, impliedly agreed with
the Ward Court's deferential test.'8 Reluctant to second guess the Kansas legislature's motivation in enacting the law, the majority deferred to
the legislature's "civil" label as sufficient proof for a non-punitive finding.1 9 Moreover, because the Kennedy factors led to ambiguous results
in earlier cases, the majority correctly predicted that the factors would
likewise fail to render the Kansas Act punitive.190 The dissent, inconsistent with the Ward decision,' 9' aligned itself with the Kennedy Court and
interpreted the seven factors as having a substantial impact on the punitive/preventive analysis. 92
B. Misinterpretingthe Role of Treatment in the PunitivePreventive
Analysis
Despite the majority's appropriate use of the two-pronged Ward punitive/preventive analysis, it nonetheless erred when it declined to consider
seriously the role of treatment in its analysis of civil commitment stat-

U.S. at 249). But see Cheh, supra note 5, at 1358 (doubting the ability of the Kennedy factors to add up to a punitive finding).
188. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085; see also supra notes 17-20 and accompanying
text (discussing the deferential nature of the Ward test).
189. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (explaining that the Court would "ordinarily
defer" to the legislature's stated intent on the question of whether its law was civil or
criminal). The majority also noted that Hendricks failed to provide the "clearest proof"
required to override the legislature's non-punitive intent. See id.
190. See id. at 2082; supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the barrage of
criticism which the Kennedy factors have received as being ineffective and inconsistent in
the punitive/preventive analysis); see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (acknowledging
that a determination of whether a law is punitive or preventive under the factors is sometimes difficult). But see Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.N.J.
1995) (concluding that under the sixth Kennedy factor the court "must find" that the notification provisions of New Jersey's registration and community notification statute were
punitive and therefore unconstitutional), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 81
F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp. 1080, 1091 (D.
Conn. 1996) (relying on the Kennedy factors in finding that the state's sex offender notification statute constituted punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause).
191. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Kennedy
factors as applied to the Kansas Act "argue[] here in favor of a constitutional characterization as 'punishment'). But see United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980) (stating
that the Kennedy factors must provide the "clearest proof" of a civil law's punitive nature
in order to override the legislature's stated non-punitive goal).
192. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Act was
punitive in light of the Kennedy factors); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 169 (1963) (establishing the importance of the seven factors in a punitive/preventive
analysis when the Court could not decipher a clear legislative intent). But see supra note
56 and accompanying text (presenting the legal criticism against the seven factors).
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utes.' 9' Consequently, the Court failed to accord the Allen Court's reasoning its proper weight in the punitive/preventive analysis. 9 4
Both the majority and concurrence departed from the Allen Court's
reliance on treatment as determinative of the punitive/non-punitive nature of a statute. The majority initially argued that no treatment even
existed for Hendricks, because the psychiatric community had not yet96
learned enough about pedophilia to provide comprehensive treatment.'
If in fact no treatment program existed for sexual predators at the time of
confinement, the majority asserted that Hendricks's confinement under
the Act would nonetheless remain non-punitive.P Clearly, the majority
disregarded Kansas's unambiguous acknowledgement that pedophilia
was a treatable mental disorder at the time of Hendricks's confinement.'9 Furthermore, the Court concluded that even if Hendricks did
193. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085 (stating that a statutory obligation to provide
treatment was sufficient to render the Act non-punitive); supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (discussing the role of treatment in the punitive/preventive analysis).
194. Compare Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (noting that treatment did not have to be
the overriding goal of the statute), with Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369, 373 (1986)
(finding that treatment was a crucial factor in distinguishing punitive from preventive civil
commitments).
195. Compare Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (finding it sufficient that treatment was
merely an "ancillary," rather than a primary, goal of the Act), with Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986) (finding the Illinois statute non-punitive based on the legislature's
overriding concern for treatment). Although Justice Kennedy appeared to regard treatment as an important indicator of a civil commitment law's non-punitive nature, he nonetheless agreed with the majority's finding that Kansas had effectively provided Hendricks
with treatment simply by writing treatment provisions onto the face of the law. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's characterization of treatment in the punitive/preventive analysis).
196. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (arguing that the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court could be read as finding that no appropriate treatment schemes existed for
Hendricks at the time of his confinement). The majority recognized, however, that where
an individual suffers from a treatable mental illness, involuntary civil commitment must be
accompanied by some form of treatment. See id.; cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
326 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (asserting that due process prevents a state from
denying treatment to an individual whom the state has involuntarily committed for "care
and treatment"); Parry, supra note 144, at 436 (interpreting the Hendricks concurrence
and dissent as finding that treatment cannot act as the basis for civil commitment but then
be denied to committed individuals).
197. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (stating that "we have never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available,
but who nevertheless pose a danger to others"); see also Foltz, supra note 158, at 36 (noting that the majority's proposition that the Constitution permitted a state to confine civilly
an untreatable, yet dangerous individual, rested on a 1902 decision regarding the confinement of an individual suffering from an untreatable, highly contagious disease).
198. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that Kansas admitted at oral argument that treatment existed for individuals like Hendricks who suffered
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suffer from a treatable mental disorder, the undisputed fact that he did
not receive or benefit from any treatment program had no impact on the
Court's analysis.199
In accordance with Allen, the majority should have looked beyond the
language of the Act to determine whether the legislature actually intended to provide treatment to sexual predators.2 °° Instead, the Hendricks majority required only that the Act's language contain treatment
provisions, regardless of whether Kansas ever provided treatment to confined individuals. 21 Similar to the deferential statutory construction approach utilized in Ward, the Hendricks majority found that as long as
treatment remained a requirement of the Act in name, the Court would
consider the law to be consistent with Allen.202
The dissent, however, pointed out that in addition to any statutory labels, the Court historically had considered the highest state court's interpretation of the purpose of its own law as an important element in the
constitutional analysis.0 3 In dissent, Justice Breyer noted that the majorfrom pedophilia). Moreover, the fact that individuals committed under the Act were receiving "31.5 hours of treatment per week" at the time of oral argument before the Court,
supports the conclusion that Kansas not only regarded pedophilia as a treatable mental
disorder, but also had the resources to provide such statutorily promised treatment. See
id. at 2085. But see Ariel Rosier, M.D. & Eliezer Witztum, M.D., Treatment of Men with
Paraphiliawith a Long-Acting Analogue of Gonadotropin-ReleasingHormone, 338 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 416, 416 (Feb. 12, 1998) (noting that treatment of male pedophiles through
the use of "[s]urgical castration, psychotherapy, and pharmacotherapy" often fails).
199. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084-85 & n.5 (acknowledging that although Hendricks received no treatment at the time of his confinement, his confinement remained
non-punitive because the State provided him with treatment ten months later).
200. See id. at 2084-85 (finding that the State's "statutory obligation" to provide
treatment sufficed for a non-punitive finding); see also Cheh, supra note 5, at 1362-63
(noting that in looking beyond a civil label, the Allen Court found that the defendant did
not provide the "clearest proof" of the punitive nature of the statute); Brief for the
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Leroy Hendricks at 11,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (stating that the "Court has []
insisted on looking beyond labels in determining the criminal or civil character of a state
imposition").
201. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085 (noting that at the time of Hendricks's incorporation into the treatment program, the State had not yet implemented its planned treatment procedures); see also Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici
Curiae at 4-5, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (arguing that
treatment under the Kansas Act is merely a "pretext" for prolonged punishment).
202. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (commenting that because the law placed an
"obligation" on the State Secretary of Social and Rehabilitative Services to provide treatment, such stated obligation was "critical" in demonstrating the Act's non-punitive nature).
203. See id. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court usually deferred to
the findings of the state and lower courts when determining the intent or purpose behind a
legislative enactment).
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ity had disregarded the Kansas Supreme Court's determination that the
Act's treatment provisions were "somewhat disingenuous., 20 4 The dissent reasoned that the Kansas legislature was more interested in confinement than in treatment. 25 The fact that the prison delayed Hendricks's treatment until he had served most of his prison sentence was a
factor on which the dissent relied to argue that treatment was not a real
aim of the statute. 2 6 Additionally, the dissent stressed that the Act's failure to provide for a less restrictive alternative to commitment, such as
post-release supervision or halfway houses, strongly indicated a legislative objective of continued punishment of repeat sex offenders.
The dissent's emphasis on a law's treatment goals, which it considered
a significant indicator of a civil commitment law's non-punitive intent, is
consistent with the most recent case on the subject.206 The Hendricks dissent advocated a less deferential stance than the majority in considering
the state legislature's characterization of the Act as civil and nonpunitive .2° The dissent closely aligned itself with the Allen Court by considering more than the legislature's stated intent when evaluating
whether the primary purpose of the statute was consistent with the expressed non-punitive intent.2 0
By deemphasizing the role of treatment in the two-pronged test as applied to civil involuntary commitment statutes, the majority broadened a
state's police powers to regulate individual behavior for the benefit of
the whole of society.2" Disagreeing with the majority's analysis, the dis204. See id. at 2093.
205. See id. (highlighting the fact that at the time Hendricks was confined the State
had not funded any treatment program); see also Brief for Respondent and Cross Petitioner at 20, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (contrasting the
Kansas Act with the Illinois Act at issue in Allen and finding that unlike the Illinois law,
the confinement conditions under the Kansas Act closely resembled the regimen imposed
on convicts).
206. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that other states
provide treatment to individuals while incarcerated).
207. See id. at 2094; see also LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 142, at 32, 33 (noting
that a state must consider whether a "least restrictive alternative" to civil commitment is
appropriate before confining an individual).
208. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 367 (1986) (regarding treatment as the benchmark in determining the punitive nature of an involuntary civil commitment statute).
209. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that when referring to involuntary civil commitment, states must "hew to the Constitution's libertyprotecting line" and "tailor the statute to fit the nonpunitive civil aim of treatment").
210. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2092; supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's analysis of Kansas's intent to provide treatment to individuals committed under the Act).
211. See supra note 175 (asserting that the Court expanded a state's authority to civilly
confine pursuant to its police powers by de-emphasizing the role of treatment in the puni-
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sent viewed a state's authority to confine defendants under civil commitment statutes as more limited. 2 The dissent's approach appears to be
the correct one in applying a less deferential two-pronged test when
analyzing the punitive nature of a civil involuntary commitment statute.
C. The Impact of the Deferential Two-Pronged Test on Lower Courts
The Hendricks holding will have a significant impact on the states'
ability to deal with the dangers posed by sexual predators.2 3 Legislatures
are presently considering enacting civil involuntary commitment laws
similar to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. 14 Such laws coexist with sex offender registration and community notification laws,
Megan's Laws, and are the next step in the fight against repeat sex
crimes.21 5 Not only will lower courts be quick to ratify their states' sexual
predator civil involuntary commitment statutes, but they also will resolve
any challenges to Megan's Laws in favor of a non-punitive finding"
Based on the Hendricks decision, upholding the involuntary confinement of sexual predators after serving most of a prison term, courts will
have little difficulty ratifying less intrusive laws, such as registration and
notification statutes, designed to attack the high recidivism rate prevalent
among released sex offenders. 7 States that currently do not have civil
commitment laws for sexual predators, will be encouraged to enact such

tive/preventive analysis).
212. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Constitution requires the states to provide treatment to civilly confined individuals); supra notes
206-08 and accompanying text (noting that the dissent correctly analyzed the act in using a
less deferential test based on a consideration of the treatment provisions embodied in the
law).
213. See Carol L. Kunz, Comment, Toward Dispassionate,Effective Control of Sexual
Offenders, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 481 (1998) (predicting that civil involuntary commitment as a method of protecting society against sexually violent predators is "expected to
gain acceptance nationwide").
214. See id. at 481 & n.209 (noting that forty-five states filed briefs with the Court supporting Kansas's civil commitment measure); see also Sex Offender's Confinement Beyond
Term Troubles Court, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 11, 1996 at 1A (stating that many other
states that were considering enacting civil commitment laws similar to Kansas's anxiously
awaited the Court's decision in Hendricks).
215. See Teir & Coy, supra note 4, at 413 (stressing the increased level of protection
that civil commitment laws offer to society from sexually violent predators); supra notes
10-11 and accompanying text (noting that all fifty states and the federal government now
have some form of sex offender registration law).
216. See McAllister, supra note 5, at 465-66 (arguing that because the Court found
Kansas's sexual predator act constitutional, then the Court likely would find the less intrusive notification and registration laws constitutional as well).
217. See id. at 466.
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legislation after Hendricks."' Public pressure, combined with a constitutional green light for the civil involuntary commitment of sexual predators, all but ensures that many states will follow Kansas's initiative."'
IV. CONCLUSION

In relying on the deferential two-pronged test of Ward, the Hendricks
majority essentially stripped the Kennedy and Allen tests of any influence
those decisions had on the punitive/preventive analysis. Sensitive to the
recent public outcry over crimes committed by released sex offenders,
the majority desired to give states wide latitude in combating the threat
that these individuals pose to communities. The majority went too far,
however, in sacrificing individual liberty for the common good. Kansas
easily could have avoided any ex post facto or double jeopardy challenges if the State simply had delivered on its promise to provide Hendricks with bona fide treatment. In upholding the Kansas Act, however,
the majority chose to take the state's word that Hendricks would receive
treatment. By ignoring the reality that Hendricks, in fact, received no
treatment for almost one year following his commitment, the majority
effectively excised the role of treatment from the punitive/preventive
analysis.

218.

See Butler, supra note 33, at S43 (noting that "[a]lthough the Court's 5-4 decision

appears close, it actually represents a ringing endorsement of the constitutionality of these
laws").

219. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (predicting that the states will rush
to pass sexual predator legislation similar to the Kansas law).
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